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This study investigates and compares the different implications of Non-Residual and 
Residual privatization operations, recognizing its dynamic character. Focusing on the 
Euro Zone countries privatizations through Public Offers we are able to provide 
evidence that only Non-Residual operations are associated with improvements in 
profitability. However, while such improvements appear to come from an improved 
financial management, improvements in Operating Profits take place actually prior to 
privatization, suggesting that governments can be effective in restructuring SOEs. 
Regarding residual ownership of firms by the State, our evidence shows that it does not 
negatively impact profitability, which is supported by the fact that residual 
privatizations yields little changes. On the contrary, we argue that our findings add to 
the scarce empirical evidence stating that residual ownership may be beneficial for both 
governments and firms. This further leads us to conclude that an effective corporate 
governance system and market conditions are actually more relevant to performance 
than ownership nature. Finally, our results in terms of efficiency question previous 
literature stating that privatization results in improved efficiency as our findings of 
improvements seem to apply to both privatized firms and their peers. We thus support 
authors arguing for the failure of most proxy measures used in previous studies to 
capture changes in operating efficiency. 
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 The debate around state ownership and privatization is nowadays more relevant 
than ever and has been reopened with the recently observed worldwide intervention of 
governments following the recent financial crisis (Borisova et all, 2012). As a matter of 
fact, despite the wave of privatizations that took place in Western Europe in the 
beginning of the 1980s, driven mostly by United Kingdom's former Prime-Minister 
Margaret Thatcher and which soon extended to the rest of the Europe, SOEs and States' 
holdings in companies still represent a considerable share of their GDP1. 
 On top of this, this debate is even more relevant in Europe since a new wave of 
privatizations is in course as a result of the recent developments in the economic 
context, with the recent Euro crisis and the consequent need to solve the problems 
which have risen from large budgets deficits and high debt levels. For example, Greece 
and Portugal, under the intervention programs of the IMF, are among the countries who 
have defined a new privatization plan which is expected to generate nearly 50bn Euros 
or 22% of Greece's GDP in 2010 and 6,5bn Euros or 3,7% of Portugal's GDP, 
respectively2. Nevertheless, as stated in a report published by Deutsche Bank Research 
the reasons for this new range of privatizations are not only related with the need to 
"help the government to reduce its debts" but also with the fact that "by relinquishing 
business activity the government can directly stimulate GDP growth, because it thus 
creates new opportunities for private-sector activity".  
 The same report goes on to argue that "experience tells us that private companies 
operate more efficiently and are more innovative".  But is this really the case? Should, 
therefore, governments privatize firms completely as was the dominant case in the 
United Kingdom's privatization process or is it possible to conciliate the defense of 
national interests and strategic industries with those of efficiency and competition? In 
order to answer these, and other question, this research paper aims to develop a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics and impact of privatization on operating performance, 
with a focus on Residual Privatization, which is becoming a more frequent phenomenon 
and is here defined as the sale of residual and non-controlling stake in firms. 
                                                          
1
 According to recent estimates Italy and France's corporate holdings, for example, represent respectively 
approximately 5,2% and 4,6% of the GDP. 
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Understanding this is crucial in making a critical assessment of whether or not 
Governments should fully exit privatized firms by selling their residual stakes.  
 The focus of the present work is then the Euro Area and former SOEs operating in 
what is denominated "strategic industries" as they account for 70% of our sample. With 
respect to previous research, this paper adds new evidence about the privatization 
process in Europe, contributing to fill the gap that "there is no study available in the 
literature investigating the performance of European privatized firms in a single and 
comprehensive statistical analysis" (Bortolotti and Milella, 2008). However, the most 
relevant contribution is perhaps the analysis made of the impact and implications of 
residual privatization and ownership in firms' performance, an issue hardly analyzed in 
previous literature. Hence, we expect to bring some additional light on whether or not 
selling residual, non-controlling stakes leads to performance improvements due to a 
decrease in the influence and involvement of Governments. Or if these type of 
operations only reasonable from a fiscal and financial point of view. By analyzing the 
first question we are also able to add new evidence to whether or not the real drivers of 
previously documented improvements in performance are the reduction of states' 
ownership or actually the changes that take place simultaneously with it. 
 The main findings of this paper are that Residual Privatization does not have a 
significant impact on performance, leading us to conclude that this is due to the fact that 
potential for improvements is lower since the profitability gap in respect to private 
firms appears to have been closed in previous privatization operations. Nevertheless, we 
do document improvements in performance in the years before residual privatization 
which leads us to advance the possibility that governments time these operations. In 
general, our findings and statistical analysis in this work provide no evidence to the 
argument that residual ownership has a negative impact on firms' profitability as long as 
an effective corporate governance system and sound economic and regulatory 
environment are in place.  
 Finally, we also offer some evidence questioning some of the previous studies' 
conclusions regarding the impact and importance of privatization in improving 
efficiency. Namely, our DiD and multivariate regression have been unable to find that a 
lower level of state-ownership is associated with improved efficiency or that privatized 
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firms are able to close the gap in terms of efficiency and our findings from our univariate 
analysis suggest that the detected improvements in profitability following privatization 
are obtained mostly due to a better management of financial resources and taxes. As a 
result, similarly to Arocena and Oliveros (2012) we also question previous studies 
methodologies and measurement of operating efficiency. 
 This paper is divided into 7 parts. The first one, entails a brief description of the 
privatization process in Western Europe and is followed by a thorough review of 
previous literature regarding privatization. We then move on to describe our main 
research questions and hypotheses. Section 4 explains how the sampling process and 
data gathering processes have been done and is followed by the description of the 
methodologies used in this work. In our 6th section we present our results and discuss 
their specific and global implications. Finally, we conclude the present paper with a 
conclusion summarizing our main findings.  
1.1 Privatization in Western Europe 
 
Figure 1 - Privatization in Western Europe: Total Revenues and Transactions 
 
Source: Elaborations on Securities Data Corporation by Bortolotti and Milella, 2008. 
To start with, privatization can be defined as the sale of a State-Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) or assets by a Government to the private sector agents, resulting in a transfer of 
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ownership which reduces the role of the Government in the local economy and is 
intended at boosting the private sector. It is usually acknowledge that the first large 
privatization program was launched by the UK's Government of Margaret Thatcher in 
the 80s, resulting in a reduction of SOEs' weight in the UK's economy from 10%  to 
almost 0%. However, ever since it we have been witnessing a considerable divestment 
of States holding in corporations through the implementation of equally large 
privatization programs all over the world, with this phenomenon becoming actually a 
global own with more than 100 countries worldwide engaged in their own privatization 
programs (Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
 Western Europe, in particular, has been extremely committed to such programs 
as it is possible to see from the fact that between 1997 and 2004 it accounted for 29 
percent of global deals and was responsible for 48 percent of global revenues based on 
calculations performed by Bortolotti and Milella (2008). Indeed, while the UK pioneered 
such phenomenon the truth is that shortly after several countries began their own 
privatization programs, though mostly lacked the scope of the UK's one. For instance, 
Italy began a long process of privatizing the companies in its State holding company IRI 
in 1985 and was followed by France in the following year, with some large companies as 
Saint Gobain privatized. Most of the European countries joined them during the 90s with 
privatization programs that became particularly strong in the mid 90s. Moreover, the 
majority of privatization programs seemed to follow a certain order since in the 
beginning firms privatized operated mostly in the manufacturing, industrial and 
financial sector and only after were firms from the denominated strategic sectors 
(telecommunications, energy, transports and utilities) privatized, which is one of the 
reasons why revenues spurred in the late 90s. 
 Despite the size and scope of this phenomenon it is important to note that in 
several cases the government continued to have a role of influence in privatized firms, 
either by direct or indirect control through voting rights but also through the use Golden 




2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 State-Owned Companies 
 Following World War II the world witnessed a tremendous growth in the use of 
SOEs in several regions. Indeed, as Megginson and Netter (2001) note the Depression, 
World War II, and the final breakup of colonial empires led many governments, in 
particular in Western Europe, to assume a more active role in the economy, namely 
through the ownership of production and provision of several goods and services. This 
period until the late 70s was characterized by a strong debate about the extent to which 
the national governments should be an active part in the regulation of the economy and 
in which industrial sectors should they have an exclusive presence. The existence of 
many SOEs was justified by the need to solve or mitigate the several types of market 
failure and reach several non-economic goals such as the need for public control over 
natural resources, regional policies, employment or social issues (Grout and Stevens, 
2003). 
 Indeed, public control over natural resources is commonly perceived as an 
argument for public ownership given the fact that profits related to extraction of natural 
resources, such as oil, are often considerably high, meaning that it may be important for 
the government to maintain the control of such rent to himself (Goldeng, Grünfeld and 
Benito, 2008). On the opposite side, the supply of public goods, which due to limited 
excludability contributes to lower profits (often the case of providing national defense 
and education) also supported the existence of SOEs in order to provide such goods at a 
socially optimal price level. Other reasons for the Government's presence in the 
corporate sector have also been stated, such as promoting the national interest 
(nationalist motives) or as a way to spur economic growth.  However, most literature 
seems to converge, in general, to the two arguments of being a response of governments 





2.1.1 Performance of SOEs 
 The recent trend towards the reduction, and in some cases nearly disappearance, 
of government's presence in firms rises the question of whether SOEs do effectively 
underperform their private counterparts, as many politicians and economists have 
argued to support the large-scale privatization programs implemented.  
 In fact, despite the fact that the majority of empirical studies supports the 
argument that there are systematic performance differences between SOEs and POEs 
(Privately Owned Enterprises) the reality is that the answer to this question is not 
unanimous between researchers as a survey of available empirical studies conducted by 
Shirley and Walsh (2000) has concluded. Indeed, among the 52 studies the authors have 
analyzed there were actually five who indicated that SOEs outperformed POEs and other 
15 studies which were not able to find clear and significant differences in performance. 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the aforementioned 5 studies were all 
regarding analyses of monopoly firms in the utility sectors, indicating that market 
structure is another important factor affecting firms' performance.  
 The meta-review of Villalonga (2000) draws a similar picture. The author splits 
its review into two groups: cross sectional studies of public-private ownership effects, 
which she argues has been the dominant type of studies in this field, and longitudinal 
studies of privatization effects. Indeed, based on her review Villalonga has concluded 
that the cumulative evidence is not fully conclusive, despite the fact that private 
ownership appears to, once again, have a clear edge in the literature (in the 153 studies 
surveyed 104 are in favor, 14 against and 35 neutral regarding the superior 
performance of private ownership). Similarly, these variance in the results may be 
attributed to the market structure in of each of the industries (and countries) where the 
firms operate and to the way efficiency is measured across the studies. 
 However, some of the most noteworthy and complete studies of public 
performance, such as Boardman and Vining (1989) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) 
have found that private corporations were significantly more profitable than 
government firms, which were also associated with higher debt levels. The latter, is 
particularly relevant not only because the authors have controlled for other possible 
explanatory factors, such as firm size, location, industry and business cycle, but also 
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because of the sample's characteristic which spanned across 20 years, and therefore 
several business cycles. 
 Moreover, in a more recent study, Goldeng, Grünfeld and Benito (2008) have 
tried to address the lack of attention characterizing most studies to the potential impact 
that the characteristics of the market may have on firms' performance. These authors 
conclude that the performance of SOEs in Norway, from where the sample is extracted, 
is indeed inferior to that of private firms, even when controlling for the market 
structure, and find a positive relationship between performance and the market share of 
companies as well as the market concentration.  
 Hence, the general belief that POEs perform better than SOEs has found 
considerable support among the majority of the empirical studies on the performance of 
SOEs, especially when they control for other factors such as market structure. 
2.1.2 Reasons for SOEs Underperformance 
 So why do SOEs underperform their private counterparts? The answers to this 
question have been well summarized in the works of Shleifer (1998), Megginson and 
Netter (2001), Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) and Arocena and Oliveros (2012) and can 
be grouped within three categories of thought. Understanding the reasons of 
underperformance is particularly useful for also understanding the reasons why 
privatization has been so vastly used. 
 
Agency theory argument 
 The first type of argument is derived from the agency theory, which considers the 
separation between ownership and control (management team) as the main source of 
the documented poorer performance of SOEs. Managers (agents) are expected to 
maximize their own utility, rather than that of the organization or its owners 
(principals), and it is argued that in POEs shareholders are better and more effective at 
aligning the objectives of the principal and the agent through a better monitoring of 
managers and the creation of incentives in order to maximize internal efficiency. Indeed, 
a better system of corporate governance and an increased number of external control 
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mechanisms, such as the market for managers or the capital markets, are important for 
SOEs to improve their performance (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989).  
 However, in the case of SOEs these mechanisms are virtually absent and the 
agency problem is further aggravated by the fact that there are actually two other 
agency relationships. Namely, the public as owners-to-politicians and politicians-to-
managers. As a matter of fact, Stiglitz (1988) distinguishes between two categories of 
incentives available to lead managers to perform well. On the one side, we have 
Individual Incentives, in which even in the case where the only public objective is, for 
example, profitability the ability of maximizing such returns is hampered by the fact that 
returns from a SOE are channelled into a public budget that no specific individual can 
take advantage of as a principal, reducing the incentives to closely scrutinize the actions 
and efforts of managers. On top of this, the fact that the public sector is usually locked 
into a pay structure limits the ability to link management salaries, or workers’, to firm's 
performance. and the traditionally higher job security in the public sectors lead to lower 
efforts and incentives to perform well. 
 On the other side Stiglitz mentions the lack of Organizational Incentives, which 
consist mostly of the role played by the capital markets in constantly monitoring POEs. 
As a result, if managers of POEs fail to use resources efficiently, the market exerts 
pressure on them by withdrawing capital from the company, taking over the company 
and reallocating its resources (internally or externally) or reducing the value of its 
holdings. 
Property rights theory argument 
 The second category lies on the property rights theory and states that managers' 
decisions in public firms are not subject to the same economic consequences as in 
private firms, decreasing their incentives to operate efficiently and maximize profits. 
Indeed, the managers of private firms are prevented from pursuing their own agenda by 
the threat of bankruptcy or takeover. In the case of SOEs, the state acts as an insurer, 
preventing them to go bankrupt through the existence of soft budget constraints, since 
any possible gap between income and expenditures is balanced by the government 
(Kornai, 1980). As a result, since the company does not need necessarily to cover its 
costs in order to ensure its sustainability the price mechanism no longer guides the 
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behaviour of managers and works as a deterrent to economic waste, leading to the 
emergence of problems such as overstaffing, excessive salaries or overinvestment.  
Public Choice argument 
 The Public Choice argument is the third category and states that politicians, 
bureaucrats and government officials pursue their own utility rather than the general 
interest, being more concerned with the maximization of their own objectives, such as 
votes, power and prestige.  Indeed, politicians may impose objectives on SOEs that 
might help them gain votes but might conflict with efficiency, resulting in a lower 
performance. One example is the protection of the interests of certain stakeholders, like 
trade unions, in detriment of the firm’s efficiency or in the pursuit of social objectives, 
such as wealth redistribution. Aggravating this is the fact that very likely the costs of 
monitoring SOEs behaviour is higher for the general public (the ultimate owners of the 
firm) than it is for interest groups as trade unions, making of SOEs an easy target for 
rent-seeking activities. Another example of such multiple objectives, is that SOEs may be 
pressured to hire politically connected people rather than those best qualified to 
manage them (Krueger, 1990). 
 
2.2 Reasons for Privatization 
 While most privatizations are carried with the purpose of bringing performance 
improvements to privatized firms they can also be conducted for other political, 
economic or financial motives (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989). Indeed, such programs tend 
to have an impact on public finances, specifically the public deficit and the debt levels (as 
many states used the proceeds to reduce their debts). It may also be that governments 
want to increase the number of stockholders and facilitate the access of citizens to 
capital markets, which are very often stimulated with such programs. Moreover, given 
that privatization appears to be stronger in countries with higher per capita GDP and 
lower growth rates may be an indicator that governments use privatization as a tool to 





2.2.1 Classification of privatization methods 
 It is equally important to look at the different methods that have been employed 
by governments all over the world when carrying out privatizations processes. As 
pointed out in Megginson and Netter (2001) the decision regarding the method of 
privatization is not always simple as they tend to very politicized and encompass several 
complexities in determining the value and the pricing of the operation. In fact, according 
to them the method of privatization is very often influenced by factors such as the 
history of the firm's ownership, the financial and competitive position of the SOE, the 
government’s view of markets and regulation, the regulatory structure in the country 
and its evolution and the capital market conditions. 
 Moreover, in the work of Brada (1996) it is possible to find a very complete 
classification into four main groups of the existing privatization methods. However, it is 
important to note that there are still some variations within each of the categories and 
that some privatizations may use a combination of more than one of the different types 
of divestment. I here present the category most often used in Western Europe:  
 Privatization through sale of state property - Sell of the government's stake in 
exchange of an explicit cash payment. This method is further subdivided into: 
o Direct sales (or private sales) of stakes of SOEs to an individual, an existing 
corporation, or a group of investors. 
o Share issue privatizations (or Public Offerings) through which some or all 
of a government’s shares in a SOE are sold to investors by means of a public share 
offering. They have some similarities with IPOs in the private sector, but while private 
IPOs aim primarily to raise revenues, SIPs are structured in order to raise money for the 
government and respond to some of the political factors already mentioned and 
discussed 
 According to data analyzed by Bortolotti and Milella (2008) while private sales 
accounted for the majority of transactions in Western Europe it has been through public 
offers that governments have raised the most revenues (only represented 28 percent of 
operations but 64 percent of revenues). This is due to the fact that such method is 
15 
 
frequently used for larger and often more profitable companies that are easier to floated 
in stock markets. 
 Finally, it is also important to note the difference between control privatization, 
which  refers to privatizations where government ownership becomes less than 50%, 
and revenue privatization, which is the opposite case when government retains more 
than 50% after the privatization stage (D'Souza and Megginson, 1999). Indeed, this 
classification is very important because it clearly considers the level of 50% of 
ownership as a relevant cut-off in understanding the impact of privatization in firms' 
performance. 
2.3 Performance of Privatized firms 
 So has privatization been successful in achieving its objectives? To answer this 
we focus our analysis on previous studies concerning the microeconomic impact of 
privatizations, disregarding on purpose the impact at the macroeconomic level, namely 
in the fiscal conditions of European countries, on the financial market development and 
on the benefits to consumers. To start with, the research within this field has been split 
into two types of studies. The first, which is considered the dominant approach, 
compares pre- and post-privatization performance of privatized firms and the second 
compares the performance of privatized firms with their private firms counterparts.  
 In one of the most comprehensive review of previous literature on privatization 
Megginson and Netter (2001) have concluded that the majority of evidence indicates 
that, in general, performance improvements are indeed registered after privatization. 
Indeed, in this review the authors mentions that nearly all the studies analyzed 
document significant improvements in privatized firms' performance. On the contrary, 
the level of employment after the privatization (a particularly sensitive issue in 
privatizations from a political point of view) does not exhibit a particularly trend of 
increase or decrease, leading the authors to conclude that the impact on employment is 
very contingent on the specific characteristics of the privatized firms.  
Comparing pre- and post-privatization performance 
 A more detailed description of the main findings of some of the most well-known 
and cited studies using this methodology is now presented. The studies of Megginson, 
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Nash, and Randenborgh, V. (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and D’Souza and 
Megginson (1999), are particularly interesting to look at since they are directly 
comparable because they use exactly the same empirical proxies, testing methodology 
but used different samples, making it possible to analyze them collectively. All these 
tests present evidence of increases in output, efficiency, profitability and capital 
investment, accompanied by decreases in the leverage used by former SOEs. Indeed, 
apart from profitability, these are all socially beneficial outcomes as they represent a 
better use of resources by firms and an improvement in their financial health 
(Megginson, 2003). 
 The study of D’Souza and Megginson (1999) particularly adds that the analysis of 
different subsamples concluding that the mentioned improvements are stronger for 
cases in which governments transfer voting control and for noncompetitive industries. 
As a result, in the authors opinion "privatization "works," and it works in almost every 
institutional setting examined". 
 However, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) have failed to find robust evidence of 
further improvement after privatization and concluded that privatization is, indeed, 
associated with improved profitability but those improvements largely occur in the 
three years before privatization. These findings, contradictory to previous research, 
appear to indicate that Governments can efficiently restructure to a certain degree firms 
before privatizing them, which appears to be the real driver of performance 
improvement and not the change in ownership per se. Hence, in order to justify 
privatization, the authors argue that governments' aim with privatizations may not be to 
achieve efficiency gains, but rather to perpetuate them in time and find some support to 
this finding in the observation of Yarrow (1986) that the improvements obtained from 
policy changes may dissipate over time without the added discipline of private 
ownership.  
 In a more recent study, Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2009) analyze the 
impact of privatization in strategic industries, which are defined as including the 
financial, mining, steel, telecommunications, transportation, utilities, oil, and military-
related production ones Megginson et al. (1994). According to these authors the same 
gains in profitability and operating efficiency of firms from strategic industries are 
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possible to be found in their sample, though it is equally interesting to note that their 
findings are consistent with no significant evidence regarding layoffs and reduction in 
the level of leverage, contrary to some previous studies and expectations regarding the 
specific nature of such industries. As a result, the gains in efficiency, similarly to La Porta 
and López-de-Silanes (1999), do not seem to result from reductions in the level of 
employment. These findings, argue the authors, can be attributed to the specific nature 
of these firms who not only are more constrained from a political point of view due to 
social welfare and stability issues but also because they carry larger amounts of debt 
than firms in non-strategic industries making it more complicated to observe an 
immediate reduction in the level of debt. 
 To end this section it is also worth mentioning some studies focusing on specific 
countries. Regarding the UK, who has mentioned was the pioneering in this field, 
Boussofiane, Martin and Parker (1997) have analyzed its privatization process and, 
similarly to Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), have concluded that the improvements in 
the efficiency of privatized firms takes place 2 or 3 years before the privatization and not 
with the change in ownership. Indeed, these findings were also corroborated in a 
previous study be Martin and Parker (1995) who found out the existence of a shake-out” 
effect, since several firms improved performance prior to being privatized but not after. 
In general the findings of these authors did not offer support to the benefits of the UK 
program, since even after adjusting for business cycle effects less than half the British 
firms studied performed better following privatization. 
 In relation to Spain, while Villalonga (2000) has shown that the effect of 
privatizations in the period of 1985 to 1995 has not always resulted in increases in 
efficiency, being very contingent on political and organizational factors, the study 
conducted by Arocena and Oliveros (2012) has found out that the efficiency of newly 
privatized firms significantly increased after their privatization, contrasting to their 
private competitors who did not show any significant improvement during the same 
post-privatization period. However, it is also worth noting that, before the privatization, 
there were no significant differences in efficiency between the SOEs and their private 
counterparts. Moreover, whilst in Italy, Goldstein (2003) only finds a modest, which is 
not statistically significant, increase in profitability as well as a decline, though also 
insignificantly, in efficiency. Similarly, but for Austria Dockner, Mosburger and 
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Schaffhauser-Linzatti (2005) fail to find significant differences between state ownership 
and privatization. Finally, it is also worth noting that Finland privatization also offers no 
evidence of improved performance, potentially because in this country SOEs were 
already well run and performed well (Willner, 2003). 
Comparing privatized firms' with private firms 
 Within the second type of studies we have the work of La Porta and López-de-
Silanes (1999) which has tried to assess performance improvements by comparing the 
privatized firms with their private counterparts. This process has the clear advantage of 
being able to separate the effects of privatization from economic or industrial wide 
effects. Using this methodology, the authors find that their sample (former Mexican 
SOEs) is capable of closing the existing performance gap in respect to their industry-
matched private peers. Indeed, these firms go from being highly unprofitable to being 
very profitable following privatization, due to productivity gains resulting from better 
incentives. Moreover, this paper is one of the first to present evidence that privatization 
when combined with deregulation, namely the removal of price/quantity controls or 
trade barriers, is more effective in improving firms' performance. 
 In addition, the study of Arcas and Bachiller (2008), which has analysed the 
differences in performance between private firms and recently privatized firms in the 
European Union, presents some evidence to the fact that, for the sample as a whole, 
privatized firms are more profitable, less leveraged and less labor intensive than private 
firms. However, it is important to bear in mind that results are not homogeneous across 
the different geographical zones. For example, while in the French and Scandinavian 
zones3 privatized firms are indeed more profitable, less leveraged, in the German zone 
differences only exist in leverage and labor intensity. On the contrary, in the British zone 
the results indicate that profitability is lower and leverage is higher for privatized firms. 
These differences may be due to different economic and legal environments or 
differences in the privatization process itself since not only the period of privatizations 
varies considerably as well as its objectives.  
                                                          
3
 The French zone refers to Belgium, Holland, Italy, France, Portugal and Spain, the German zone includes Germany and Austria, the 
Scandinavian zone consists of  Denmark and Sweden and the British zone is  Ireland and UK. The study also included an Eastern Zone 
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 In conclusion, despite the clear bias towards supporting the beneficial impact 
that privatization has in former SOEs' performance and efficiency there is still space 
within this debate. Either because the existing literature is not unanimous regarding this 
point, with some authors supporting the argument that the key to improvement is not 
privatization itself but rather the changes imposed on firms or others finding that 
improvements incur mostly prior and not after privatization, or because there are still 
some problems that the mentioned studies are not capable of fully addressing. Such 
problems can be methodological, namely in terms of the sample selected or the 
methodology used to assess efficiency and performance, or for not fully incorporating 
other determinant factors in their analysis, namely the market structure or the 
economic and regulatory environment in which firms operate. On top of this, the results 
also seem to differ from country to country, particularly within developed economies, 
preventing researchers to have advanced an "unambiguous answer about the role of 
privatization on the financial and operating performance of European SOEs" (Bortolotti 
and Millela, 2006). 
 
2.3.1 Sources of Privatizations value creation  
 Having concluded that privatization, on average, leads to performance 
improvements in the performance of former SOEs a new question emerges: how do 
privatizations lead to such performance improvements? In trying to answer this Cuervo 
and Villalonga (2001) have proposed a model, whose underlying assumption is that 
privatization is a discrete and exogenous change that leads to several endogenous 
changes in the strategy and organization of the privatized firm, to explain the factors 
influencing the ultimate effect of changes that the privatization process might trigger on 
performance (for a summary of their model see the appendix). Hence, what are the 
changes that privatization operates and are behind the improvements in performance? 
The answers to these questions are essential in order to better understand the variance 
that was detected in the cited empirical tests. 
 Based on the analysis of Cuervo and Villalonga (2001) and D'Souza, Megginson 
and Nash (2007), often complemented with other's authors findings,  it is possible to 
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summarize the following factors as the most relevant in leading to performance 
improvements: 
1) Changes in ownership structure: Differences in state ownership, foreign 
ownership, and employee ownership are likely to affect the performance of privatized 
firms  
a. Level of post-privatization ownership retained by the state should play a crucial 
role in the newly privatized firm's efficiency improvements. In fact, Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1996) expect efficiency gains from privatization only in the cases where control 
rights are transferred to private investors. This results from the fact that the likelihood 
of government interference and possible re-nationalization is increased when selling 
only a small stake. Nevertheless, despite such prediction the empirical evidence is not 
unanimous. For instance, while D’Souza and Megginson (1999) conclude that 
performance improves more when governments transfer the voting control for the 
private sector (control privatization), D’Souza et al. (2007) reach a different conclusion, 
as they are not able to find differences statistically significant when control is 
transferred. This finding is even more puzzling if we consider the results that the last 
authors obtain in their profitability regression, which reveals a significantly positive 
relationship between profitability and state ownership. As a result, in an attempt to 
explain this findings, the authors advanced that a large residual stake gives the 
government greater incentives to encourage performance improvements with the 
objective of maximizing proceeds from subsequent privatization rounds. 
b. The presence of foreign investors, who may bring either new know-how or 
investment capacity and act as a more powerful monitor of firms' performance, and the 
amount of employee share ownership, who may be unlikely to support certain value 
maximizing initiatives if perceived as dangerous to their job security (Boycko et al., 
1996), may also affect the degree of post-privatization performance. As a matter of fact, 
empirical evidence tends to favor the presence of foreign investor by suggesting that 
larger increases in performance take place when privatized firms are controlled by 
external investors. On the contrary, the empirical evidence regarding the influence of 
employees’ ownership on firms’ performance is not so conclusive.  
c. Shareholding structure is also relevant as the move from a concentrated 
shareholding (with the state as major shareholder) to an intermediate level of 
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ownership concentration, where no large shareholder dominates and where the boards 
effectively performs their control role, improves the effectiveness of privatized firm's 
new goals and incentive schemes in triggering the desired performance gains. 
 
 2) Changes in upper management: The replacement of the management team, 
often politically appointed, with a professional businessperson should lead to 
performance improvements. This argument is further supported on the reasoning that 
not only may existing managers be reluctant to implement or even allow some of the 
necessary organizational changes (Martin and Parker, 1997) but also because the new 
team may bring in resources and capabilities which fit best the competitive market 
environment that accompanies privatization and deregulation, whereas the incumbent 
managers skills were more suited to dealing with politicians. In fact, D’Souza et al. 
(2007) are able to find statistical support to this assertion as they show that profitability 
increases significantly for firms with greater than 50% change in board of directors, 
whilst it decreases, insignificantly, for firms with less than 50% change. 
 
 3) Changes in the Strategy of the firm - Privatization prompts a firm to engage 
in scope-enhancing corporate strategies and in more innovative and less focused 
business strategies. This is due to the fact that very often managers in SOEs feel that any 
potential benefits from their investments can be expropriated and will not likely affect 
their compensation. On the contrary, losses may jeopardize their jobs. Thus, strategies 
requiring substantial investments are perceived as "high risk, low return", reducing 
considerably their appeal. In the case of the risk of losing the job is counterweighted 
with the increase in compensation which a good strategy can result. Hence, the 
incentives to invest under private ownership tend to be bigger than in SOEs. 
Furthermore, in SOEs both the location and the scope of activity are constrained 
politically and geographically by the state as owner, who tends to focus essentially on 
the home market. Under private ownership these limitations disappear and firms are 
free to engage in internationalization and entering new markets. Indeed, 
internationalization is one of the drivers of the growth registered by privatized firms, 
who try to leverage their, traditionally, strong position in the internal market. 
4) Restructuring: Usually the main driver of value creation that comes from 
the privatization process are the transformations which take place within the former 
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SOEs either before or after privatization, which make it better equipped to compete as a 
private enterprise. Supporting this is the finding of D’Souza et al. (2007) that firms 
which restructure are the ones who register larger improvements in operating efficiency 
as it apparently leads to a more efficient deployment of resources.  
a. Organizational/operational restructuring and Corporate Governance 
changes - This type of restructuring is concerned with the internal functioning of the 
organization, namely its production methods and management structure. The closing, 
consolidating, or overall reorganization of its production facilities or the modernization 
of operations are clear examples of such changes. However, the most relevant change is 
perhaps the introduction or improvement of the prevailing incentive schemes and 
control mechanisms, which become more outcome and market based. 
According to the already described public choice and agency theorists goals 
and incentives (or control) are the central variables shaping the privatization-
performance relationship. While goals in private firms are clear and related to profit 
maximization and value creation for shareholders, in state-owned firms the goals are 
usually blurred, multiple, conflicting and unstable (Cuervo, 1997). In addition, so are the 
incentive schemes and control mechanisms of private firms in general more effective 
than that of SOEs in private firms. This is due to the internal control departments and 
boards of directors in private firms being usually better informed than their 
counterparts in SOE, where the alignment of objectives with external agencies is in 
general weak. Hence, changes in incentives and controls are of great importance to 
trigger the performance improvements. 
 Moreover, privatization prompts the firm to adopt a more decentralized 
organizational structure and a greater customer orientation. Indeed, privatization may 
free managers, if not replaced, from politicians' control, allowing them to exercise their 
latent managerial talent (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In addition, the privatized firm's 
corporate culture can also be expected to change. For instance, with the adoption of 
financial goals and more outcome and market-based incentives, the firm will likely move 
from a production orientation to a customer orientation culture (Cuervo, 1997; Martin 
and Parker, 1997). 
 b. Acquisitions and divestments - The newly privatized firm may engage in 
acquisitions, representing a strategy to pursue the new growth opportunities created by 
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the transfer from state control, or in divestments, which are associated with efforts to 
focus on the most profitable segments, downsizing to a more efficient and sustainable 
functional form. On top of this, privatized firms may also merge with other private firms 
to capture potential synergies and increase scale 
 III- Financial restructuring - This method of restructuring typically involves a 
reduction in the leverage of the newly privatized firm. In the sample of D’Souza et al. 
(2007) firms' financial restructurings consisted essentially of debt payoffs, debt write-
offs, and leverage-reducing recapitalizations, like debt-equity swaps 
5) Macroeconomic and institutional environment:  
a. The level of capital market development is also important in bringing the 
desired performance improvement since under the capital market scrutiny the 
monitoring of managerial performance is improved. In fact, the empirical tests 
conducted in the aforementioned paper indicate that firms in larger, more developed 
financial markets experience larger gains in efficiency 
b. Political and economic environment can also be an important factor in 
influencing the transition to being private, with a sound and stable environment helping 
fostering the improvements in performance 
c. The competitive forces can also stimulate greater efficiency and profitability.  
Vickers and Yarrow (1989) argue that while privatization should lead to efficiency gains 
when competitive environments exist there seems to be no advantage to private 
ownership when market power exists. Other empirical studies, such as Megginson et al. 
(1994) and La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), have identified that the efficiency 
gains are significantly greater for firms in competitive markets in comparison to 
regulated industries. For this reason, price deregulation and market liberalization are 
also correlated with higher performance gains 
 
 To sum up, it is important to note that it is the failure to induce some of the 
mentioned changes in the proper and most effective way or the inadequate conduction 
of the privatization process that hinder the former SOEs to achieve its full potential in 
terms of performance increasing. 
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2.3.2 Maintaining influence after privatization  
 As it is pointed by Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004) "the sale of a majority holding 
is not itself a sufficient condition to avoid government interference in privatized 
companies", which can be a deterrent to the successful implementation of the changes 
described in the previous section. Indeed, on top of the fact that very often governments 
maintain a residual or even controlling stake in privatized firms (in the sample of  N. 
Boubakri et al. (2009) 28% of firms continue to have the government as a controlling 
shareholder) it is also important to mention two additional mechanisms employed by 
governments to continue exerting their influence in former SOEs. 
 Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar (2008) examine the impact of the first of these 
mechanisms:  political connections, which concerns the appointment of politicians to 
important positions in the privatized firm. Indeed, these authors' sample registers a 
total of 35.51% firms (87 out of 245) who continue to be politically-connected after 
privatization, identifying the size of residual government ownership and the presence of 
foreign investors as two factors driving the likelihood of a firm remaining politically-
connected. As expected, such firms appear to underperform their non connected peers. 
 In addition, thanks to the use of the second mechanism, Golden Shares, 
governments are equally able to continue exerting its influence on privatized firms since 
"by exerting its rights, the “special” shareholder can often influence the choice of 
management, exert veto power over the acquisition of relevant stakes by private 
shareholders, even without owning the majority of stock in the company, or a single 
share of capital" (Bortolotti and Milella, 2008). Very often the use of such special rights 
are justified on the basis of protecting the "national interest". The same authors show 
that Golden Shares have been widely used by European Governments, especially in 
respect to strategic industries as according to their sample in 1996 golden shares were 
present in 100% of the privatized firms in the defense sector, 83% in the 
telecommunications, 62% in the oil and gas and 64% in the utilities sector. Nevertheless, 
it is also worth mentioning that the recent years have witnessed a substantial decrease 
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in the existence of these mechanisms in particular in Western Europe following 
pressures of the European Union in that direction4.  
 
2.4 Partial privatization and residual state ownership 
 Having analyzed the drivers of performance improvements in privatization new 
questions arise: do states have to fully privatize firms in order for such changes to take 
place and in order for them to be perpetuated over time? Or, on the contrary, is partial 
privatization an equally effective solution to the underperformance that some SOEs 
exhibit? Among the reasons why governments retain residual ownership in privatized 
firms it is possible for us to point out their objective of maximizing revenues from future 
tranches as well as their goal of signaling to the market the value and commitment 
towards the privatized firm. On the other hand, it may also be due to the governments' 
reluctance to relinquish control of privatized firms in sectors which they consider 
economically and politically strategic (Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami, 2005). 
 This issues have been partially addressed in some studies though the attention 
researches have devoted to understanding them and its implications has clearly been 
lower than in understanding the previous topics analyzed in this literature review. 
Nevertheless, as Gupta (2005), among others, has noted firms described as "partially 
privatized" or "public-private partnerships" have long represented a substantial 
percentage of all state divestments. As a matter of fact, this situation is well illustrated 
by Vaaler and Schrage (2009) who point out that the broad sweep of empirical research 
has never examined the performance impact of state ownership when it becomes a non-
controlling minority (<50%) tranche or in other words maintains a residual state 
ownership.  
 More importantly, the existing literature regarding this topic, even though not 
abundant, has been particularly divided. On the one hand, a great amount of studies, 
some of which already presented previously, indicate that efficiency gains can only be 
obtained when control rights are passed from the government to the private sector; 
which has became known as the “political interference” hypothesis. Furthermore, a 
particularly relevant finding is presented in the work of N. Boubakri et al. (2009), whose 





sample supports the assertion that residual state ownership has a detrimental effect on 
performance of strategic firms. However, this impact seems to be more moderated in the 
presence of better protected environments as well as in countries with right-wing 
regimes. 
 On the other hand, the number of authors arguing the opposite has been 
increasing. For instance, Perotti (1995) has developed the "credible privatization" 
theory, which states that governments can signal commitment by only selling a small 
portion of the firm at the beginning, namely of the state's willingness to intervene on 
their behalf and share their economic fate. This affects positively the necessary changes 
needed to improve performance as well as shareholder returns following strategic 
decisions. Moreover, Sun, Tong and Tong (2002) have argued that government 
shareholders may provide additional benefits to privatized firms, namely their political 
support and business connections.  
 On top of this, Bortolotti and Faccio (2006) have demonstrated that residual 
ownership leads to higher market valuations in their sample regarding OECD countries. 
Similarly, Liao and Young (2012) have found that residual government ownership can 
have a positive impact on Tobin's Q (approximated as book assets minus book equity 
plus market value of equity divided by book assets), providing evidence that residual 
government ownership has a positive impact on post-privatization performance, at least 
as far as China is concerned. This seems to be particularly true when the risk of 
expropriation by parent companies is high as government's can add value to the 
privatized firms by signaling their commitment to privatization through the residual 
stake. 
 Vaaler and Schrage (2009) have also questioned the prevailing studies arguing 
that privatizing firms' performance generally improves with decreasing state ownership 
and the passage of time. As a result, the author finds, through an event study, the 
potential supporting role residual state ownership can have, namely in enhancing 
former SOEs' strategic decision-making and financial performance. An effect which was 
particularly noticeable in the cases characterized by instability in the home-country 
investment policy environment.  
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3 Research Question and Hypothesis 
 As already discussed and analyzed previously although the impact of government 
ownership on firm performance has long been debated in the finance literature the 
findings remain inconclusive. It is still an empirical question whether government 
shareholders expropriate firms for the benefit of politicians and bureaucrats, or provide 
political and business support that benefits privatized firms. Hence, it is the objective of 
the present study and the following analysis to understand if when the State decides to 
further divest its residual and non-controlling stakes in privatized firms, reducing its 
influence on these firms, performance is affected. 
 In addition, we will also try to uncover several questions, based on our sample, 
that have not gathered consensus in previous research such as whether or not the state 
is capable of restructuring SOEs and if residual ownership by governments has a 
negative impact in performance. All this analyses will help understand, for instance, 
what is the ideal level of State ownership, namely whether or not the state should fully 
privatize firms or maintain a residual ownership. 
 Before moving on to the current study's hypothesis it is important to make some 
clarifications regarding the terminology here applied in order to avoid any potential 
confusion. Whenever we refer to residual privatization it concerns all the privatization 
transactions in which the state sells part or all of a residual and non-controlling position 
and the remaining transactions are denominated non-residual privatization (see 
appendix for more detailed description). This concept is different from partial 
privatization which entails privatizing part of the firm, but without the transfer of 
control.  
3.1 Hypothesis Statement 
 
Hypothesis 1: Privatization impact in operating performance and efficiency is stronger 
for initial stages of privatization 
 Hypothesis 1.1: Privatizations where the State has a non-controlling and residual 
stake do not have a significant impact in performance and efficiency 
 Following previous studies findings we expect an increase in the profitability and 
efficiency measures for non-residual transactions. On the contrary, we do not anticipate 
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changes in operating performance following residual stakes privatizations to be 
significant. This is due to the fact that most of the changes that lead to performance 
improvements, previously summarized in the literature review, have already taken 
place in the previous privatization operations. This hypothesis goes therefore on the 
same logic of Martin and Parker (1995) as well as Kole and Mulherin (1997) who have 
presented evidence supporting the view that SOEs are intrinsically no less efficient than 
private firms as long as they operate in the same competitive conditions as private. As a 
result, if such hypothesis is confirmed it may be an indicator that state ownership by 
itself is not detrimental to firms' performance since the reduction of state's ownership 
alone does not induce performance improvements, being the aforementioned changes 
the real trigger for increasing former SOEs performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The government is capable of successfully restructuring SOEs, improving 
their performance, before privatization 
 Following the finding of Boussofiane, Martin and Parker (1997) and Dewenter 
and Malatesta (2001) that improvements in performance take place, not after the 
privatization, but in the 3 years before we also expect that privatizations improvements 
will also be found in the years immediately before the privatization, but only for 
operations classified as non-residual. Indeed, such expectation only applies to this 
subgroup as only in it do governments have majority control in order to be able to 
enforce restructuration in an attempt to make the firms to be privatized more attractive 
and hence maximize the proceeds coming from the privatization. For operations 
regarding residual stakes we continue to expect no significant improvement in the years  
in the years before the transaction, though these effects may be stronger if such 
operations where preceded by non-residual transactions before. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Privatized firms close the performance gap in terms of profitability and 
efficiency regarding their private counterparts following privatization 
Hypothesis 3.1: Firms where the state owns a residual stake do not underperform their 
private counterparts 
 As already explored one of the main arguments behind privatization is that SOEs 
underperform their counterparts and that privatization is a tool that will, in general, 
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lead to an improvement in firms' performance, allowing them to catch up with their 
peers. However, most of the literature, as pointed out by Arocena and Arocena (2012), 
fails to "properly compare the performance level of a formerly public firm before and 
after its privatization with that of achieved by its private competitors". We will therefore 
try to address this gap in literature by comparing the performance of privatized firms 
before and after each of the privatization operations. It is our hypothesis that, similarly 
to La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), our sample of privatized firms will be able to 
close the performance gap regarding their private counterparts.  
 Nevertheless, it is also important to mention our expectation that such gap will be 
closed essentially in the first stages of privatization, here defined as non-residual 
transactions. For residual privatization operations we do not expect that because the 
gap will have already disappeared, leaving little room for improvement. In this context, 
Gupta (2005) has found out that SOEs in India who were only partial privatized have 
also exhibited significant improvements in profitability, productivity and investment, 
which can be partially attributed to the often ignored role stock markets can have in 
ensuring an adequate monitoring and rewarding of manager's performance, even in the 
cases when government retains control. Hence, it is our expectation that residually 
owned firms will not underperform their counterparts, meaning that the impact of 
residual ownership to performance is residual. 
 
3.2 Other Relationships Expected 
 Regarding capital investment we expect them to increase following initial stages 
of privatization and to remain relatively stable in the more advanced stages, namely in 
respect to residual stakes privatizations. This expectation is based on work of N. 
Boubakri et al. (2009) who have found, based on their sample that privatized firms 
operating in strategic industries increase their capital investment following 
privatization. This may be explained, according to the authors, by the fact that these are 
firms mostly capital intensive and technology-oriented who require high levels of capital 
investments and whose new private owners are capable of providing them. 
 On the one hand, N. Boubakri et al. (2009) argue that privatizations may involve 
lay-offs and labor shedding in SOEs due to the fact that they were previously overstaffed. 
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On the other hand, Megginson and Netter (2001) have concluded, based on their review 
of previous studies, that the impact on employment differs considerably from sample to 
sample. Hence, our only prediction is that our subsample of Residual Privatization will 
not exhibit reductions in employment and may probably be associated with increases in 
the number of employees as the firms grow in size and very often expand their 
operations geographically. 
 In terms of leverage, following the finding of previous studies, we expect that 
with the transfer of ownership to private hands a significant decline in leverage should 
be expected given the removal or reduction of the government’s debt guarantees, 
combined with the new possibility of privatized firms accessing of capital markets. As a 
result, we expect that the Non-Residual Group will be associated with significant 
leverage decreases. On the contrary, making predictions about the impact of residual 
privatization on leverage is far more complex because it is very contingent on the period 
in which it takes place. Despite this our expectation is that no effects will be found in 
such group due to the fact that the time since initial privatization is higher, which has 
allowed firms to operate their financial restructuring, and the government to gradually 
remove the debt guarantees. 
4 Sampling Process and Data Gathering 
 To start with, it is important to note that, contrary to some of the previous studies 
who tend to "define the privatization event date to be that on which the government 
divests, for the first time, a certain amount of shares" (N. Boubakri et al, 2009), the focus 
of this paper, as already mentioned, is in the stages in which the government sells a 
residual stake in privatized firm. As a result, its scope goes beyond the first divesture 
made by governments, although such stages are also included in order to serve as a 
benchmark. This is done in order to recognize that more often than not, especially for 
strategic firms, governments privatize SOEs through several stages that may last several 
years and that they also tend to retain a residual ownership on former SOEs.  
 In addition, it is also important to note that our sample also includes other 
situations that allow us to infer the impact of state's ownership, such as reduction of 
control through capital increases (which has sometimes been an alternative to 
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privatization as to avoid going through the approval of local parliaments or in order to 
speed up the privatization process) or actual investments made by the government in 
previously private firms. Nevertheless, such operations represent less than 5% of our 
final sample. 
 
4.1 Sample Selection 
 In order to study the mentioned questions a sample privatized firms until 2007 of 
the countries which belonged to the Euro Zone in 2005, with the exception of 
Luxembourg has been built. This sample was initially retrieved from Privatization 
Barometer Database, a database which contains all the privatizations transactions which 
took place from 1977 to the present.  
 Although a total of 1135 transactions concerning the studied countries are 
reported in this database our final sample, after several treatments, only includes 172 
events.  First, given the very specific nature of financial institutions these firms have 
been excluded from the sample, similarly to other authors as Arcas and Bachiller (2008), 
resulting in the exclusion of 263 privatization operations from the initial sample. 
Moreover, the present study also excludes firms privatized through Private Sale because 
the availability and reliability of data is higher for Public Offers. Indeed, obtaining the 
information from firms which were privatized through Private Sale is substantially more 
complicated and subject to several inaccuracies since such firms are not subject to the 
same requirements in terms of disclosing financial information and most of them 
actually cease to exist after the privatization because they are incorporated into their 
new owner. 
 In addition, we pretend to focus mostly in strategic firms, which are, in general, 
privatized by Public Offers as it allows the government to maximize the respective 
proceeds. We have chosen to do so due to the considerably higher implications state 
ownership has in such firms and because such debate is a far more sensitive issue and 
important as a result of their importance in the local economy, level of employment or in 
the governments' income, either as a flow of dividends or as taxes on income. Moreover, 
such subset of SOEs has some features particularly differentiating from other 
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competitive industries as they are usually associated with state monopoly and strong 
regulation as well as complex political and institutional issues (N. Boubakri et al., 2009). 
 Finally, all the cases in which we were not able to retrieve accounting information 
for at least two years after and before were also excluded from the final sample as well 
as all the transactions within a firm which did not distance themselves more than 3 
years. This last step is particularly important as it is quite frequent for SOEs to be 
privatized in several tranches, with some of them taking place in a very short period of 
time which could give a stronger weight to some firms within the sample as the effects 
of the stages would be mixed. In such cases I have chosen to include what I considered to 
be the "stronger" stage of privatization, namely either the last one taking place in the 
shorter period of time (particularly if it concerned stages in which no control transfer 
occurred) or the stage in which the control was transferred to private hands.  
 To better illustrate this point let's take the case of Greencore, an Irish firm 
privatized in the following three stages: 55% in 1991, 15% in 1992 and the remaining 
30% in 1993. Indeed, in order to be accurate in translating the real impact of this 
privatization process only the operation that took place in 1991 was considered as they 
represent the years in which control was transferred. Had we done otherwise and 
considered the last stage of the privatization operations, where in reality only a residual 
stake was sold, and the impact in performance of the residual privatization stage could 
be misleading as it would very likely translate changes in performance which are mostly 
due to the stage in which the control was transferred to private investors. Hence, in 
accordance to previous literature which points to the fact that when control is 
transferred the highest improvements in performance are expected, this stage was 
considered as the strongest one. 
 As a result, our final sample is made up of 106 firms who have been part of 172 
privatization events relevant to our study. Moreover, as it is possible to conclude from 
looking at the description tables presented in the appendix strategic industries are, 
indeed, heavily represented in our sample accounting as they represent approximately 
70% of our sample (within the Manufacturing Sector 11 companies operate in the Steel 




4.2 Determining State's Ownership 
 One of the key variables to this study is the percentage owned by the state, either 
directly or indirectly, in each of the privatized firms in each year. This information is 
important not only to make an accurate classification of the several privatization stages 
included in the sample but also for the purpose of assessing whether or not privatized 
firms in each the government owns a residual stake underperform or not their private 
counterparts. 
 For the purpose of obtaining this information several sources have been used and 
crossed in order to ensure its accuracy, which was particularly critical for the 
privatizations which took place in the 90s where ownership data is scarcer and lacks 
reliability. This data was therefore hand collected from ThomsonOne, a database which 
provides ownership data for public firms after 1997, Privatization Barometer and 
Megginson's Appendix of Firms Privatized Through Public Share Offerings between 
1961 and August 20005. However, since these three sources very often either contained 
contradictory information or lacked information for several years, the following 
resources have also been used extensively: 
 Firm's website's and Annual Reports 
 Public Organization's responsible for either managing or privatizing SOEs: 
o The Österreichische Industrieholding AG (ÖIAG) which is responsible for 
managing the Austrian Government participations in companies as well as 
executing the privatization mandate - http://www.oiag.at/ and respective 
reports retrieved from Privatization Barometer 
o Finland's Ownership Steering Department which " is in charge of the 
practical-level ownership steering of companies operating on market 
terms" - http://valtionomistus.fi/english/ and its annual reports  
o Spanish Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) 
http://www.sepi.es/ 
 Papers concerning the privatization process in each of the countries belonging to 
the sample 
 News regarding privatization operations 
                                                          
5
 Megginson, W.L., 2003. Appendix 1: Details of share issue privatizations, 1961– 2002. In: Megginson, William 
L. (Ed.), Financial Economics of Privatization. Oxford University Press, New York. 
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 Moreover, in defining the percentage of the privatized firm controlled by the 
Government the definition used in the works of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(1999) and Bortolotti and Faccio (2004) of ultimate control has been used. These 
authors consider ultimate control as the voting rights which are, directly or indirectly, 
controlled by public shareholders, which can range from the Government itself to Public 
Banks, other SOEs or regional bodies. As a result, the effective control/ownership of the 
state has been computed as the weakest link along the control chain. This methodology 
therefore takes into account both pyramiding and cross-holdings schemes. The 
following example with STMicroelectronics illustrates the usefulness of such 
methodology very clearly: 
Figure 2 - Illustration of the shareholding structure as of December 31, 2009 
 
Source: Obtained from respective Annual Report 
 In this case the ultimate control by the State (which in this case is split between 
the French and the Italian States as this company resulted from the merger of two 
former SOE) was defined as 27,5%. This value can be easily computed by indeed looking 
at the weakest link in the value chain of shareholdings. Furthermore, it is extremely 
relevant to highlight the importance of having included such a definition of control. First, 
since this methodology was also used when classifying the privatizations events there 
were cases in each such classification was affected. For example, as noted by Willner 
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(2003) although since 1994 the stake of Finland's Government in Outokumpu was below 
50% the fact is that this firm remained under public control for a long period of time 
since The Finnish Social Insurance Institution continued to own approximately 12.3% of 
the shares.  
 Second, and most important, using this methodology has allowed us to remove 
from our sample some operations classified in Privatization Barometer as privatization 
in which there was no effective change in Control. Two illustrative cases are the IPOs of 
Ansaldo STS and Snam Rete Gas. These firms were owned by two former Italian SOEs in 
which the state remained an active shareholder. Namely, Finmeccanica and ENI, both  
owned in 30% by the Italian Government, respectively. Indeed, due to this shareholding 
structure at the time these two firms placed Ansaldo STS and Snam Rete Gas on the 
stock exchange the effective control of the Government did not change and remained at 
30% for both cases, which remained as the weakest link of the control chain. 
 
4.3 Peers Selection 
 In order to test for hypothesis 3 it was necessary to select and obtain data for a 
comparable set of private companies. In order to be able to isolate the effects of state 
ownership the set of comparable companies was intended to only include companies 
where government's were never shareholders. However, it is extremely difficult to 
obtain comparable peers in terms of size and within Europe for most of the strategic 
industries. Such industries include several sectors that were dominated by SOEs or even 
where only SOEs were allowed to participate. For example, the telecommunications 
sector in Europe is dominated by Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, 
TeliaSonera and Telefonica, from which only Vodafone was never state owned. As a 
result, some criteria had to be lessen in order to obtain the required number of peers 
and some former UK SOEs were also included in the peer group since most of them were 
privatized even before the 90s, namely British Telecom, BP Group and several former 
UK's utilities firms owned by the government before, became clear as the process of 
selecting peers advanced. 
 The matching was done using ThomsonOne database, with the all the data being 
obtained from Datastream since all companies considered for the peer group had to be 
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publicly listed in order to increase comparability and reliability of data. This matching 
procedure resulted in a total of 106 peers, was as it follows: 
1) Have the same 4 SIC Code, the difference in size at the intermediate event be 
lower than 40% and belong to Europe - 19 firms fulfilled this criteria 
2) Have the same 4 SIC Code and the difference in size at the intermediate event be 
lower than 40% - 30 firms fulfilled this criteria 
3) Have the same 2 SIC Code and the difference in size at the intermediate event be 
lower than 40% - 25 firms fulfilled this criteria 
4) Have the same 2 SIC Code and the difference in size at the intermediate event be 
lower than 60% - 13 firms fulfilled this criteria 
5) Have the same 4 SIC Code and either operate in Europe or have the possible 
closest value of assets - 19 firms fulfilled this criteria 
5 Methodology 
 To test our first two hypothesis we follow the methodology that become widely 
used in studies on the impact of privatization following the work of Megginson et al. 
(1994). This methodology compares pre and post-privatization results, using a set of 
empirical proxies, through the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which tests if the median 
difference in the computed values of each variable between the pre- and post-
privatization periods is zero. The performance measurement proxies for each company 
are computed over the period [-3,-1] and [1,3], meaning that the year of privatization 
(year 0) is excluded from this analysis as it includes a period in which governments' 
ownership registered two different values. 
 The proxies used for firms' operating performance also following the same study, 
with the difference that instead of using Return on Equity (ROE) we use EBIT Margin 
due to our belief that profitability changes are better captured with measures that are a 
ratio of two current-dollar flows. In addition, Output, defined as Real Sales, has also been 
excluded from this study given the specific nature of the firms belonging to the sample 
who tend to be very large and have sales across several geographies, making Real Sales, 
from our perspective, a weaker proxy to Output since it only considers the local inflation 
rate. Replicating the same performance measures offers the clear advantage of making 
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the results comparable to other studies regarding the impact of privatization as such 
methodology has also been used by several authors, including Boubakri and Cosset 
(1998), J.E. Farinós et al. (2007) and N. Boubakri et al.(2009), among others. 
Table 1 - Proxies used to measure operating performance 
 
 For most proxies local currency and nominal values have been used as they are 
less sensitive to inflation and to accounting conventions. Regarding the measures of 
operating efficiency two additional notes are necessary. First, SALEFF not only uses 
Sales deflated by the local consumers prices index (CPI), retrieved from the IMF's World 
Economic Outlook Database, but also adjusts the value so that year 0 is equal to 1, 
increasing the comparability between years. Second, INEFF, contrary to Megginson et al. 
(1994) is not normalized as SALEFF due to the fact that net income can assume negative 
values. Instead, what is considered is the change regarding the value of year 0: 
 
 To test hypothesis 2 we have replicated the just described methodology with the 
difference that we have considered as the reference year the second year before the 
privatization, or by other words year -2 instead of year 0. As a result the performance 
will be compared between period [-5,-3] and [-1,1]. 
 Moreover, in order to test Hypothesis 3 we have used the Difference-in-
Differences (DiD) technique, which allows us to assess the impact that privatization, 
often named the treatment factor, has on privatized firms in comparison to firms not 
affected by this event, denominated as control or peer group. This impact is determined 
Return on sales (ROS)= Net Income/ Sales
Return on assets (ROA)= Net Income/Total assets
EBIT Margin (OP) = EBIT/Sales
Sales efficiency (SALEFF)= Real sales/Employees
Income efficiency (INEFF)= Net Income/Total employment
Capital investment to sales (CESA)= CAPEX / Sales
Capital investment to total assets (CETA)= CAPEX / Assets
Employment Employment (EMPL)= Number of employees
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by considering two distinct differences in the variable of interest: one temporal 
difference, namely before and after the event, and another difference between the 
groups of interest, namely the privatized firms and their private peers. The DiD 
regression is then as it follows: 
Model 1: Performance it= β0+ β1 Privatized it + β2 After it + β3Privatizedi*After it+ εit (1) 
 All the explanatory variables included in the specification above are dummy 
variables aimed at capturing different effects. After is a variable that assumes the value 
of 1 in the years after the privatization takes place, namely in the 3 years after it. 
Nevertheless, it is from the coefficients of Privatized and Privatized*After that it is 
possible to observe the effect of privatization. Privatized is a variable which takes the 
value 1 for firms which were privatized and 0 for our control group and its coefficient, 
β1, captures differences in the performance variable before privatization. Moreover, β3, 
also known as DiD estimator, is what allows us to test whether or not the privatized firm 
has been able to close the performance gap following privatization. 
 Hence, for Hypothesis 3 to be supported it is necessary that, to start with, there is 
a performance gap prior to privatization and, if so, that the coefficient β3 is positive and 
statistically significant. Moreover, it is necessary to note that Model 1 is never used 
exactly as above since we always distinguish the type of privatization according to our 
two subsamples in order to assess whether or not differences exist between the 
situation before and after privatization between the two.  
 To test hypothesis 3.1 we first determine whether or not the differences in the 
performance variables are statistically significant both before and after the event in our 
DiD regression. However, by doing so we are not only excluding several firms residually 
owned from our sample but also failing to properly account for several exogenous 
factors that may explain the performance gap. As a result, we will also analyze the effects 
of privatization and state ownership for a sample of public firms owned by the State by 
estimating the following two general models using panel estimation techniques, while 
controlling for the influence of other firm- and country-level variables which may affect 
performance: 
Model 2: Performance it= αi+β1 State Ownership it+β2 Control Variables it+ εit (2) 
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Model 3: Performance it= αi+β1 Dummies for State Ownership it+β2 Control Variables it+ 
εit (2) 
 The models above state include a total of  80 partially owned firms and 153 
private firms as peers for a period ranging from 3 to 8 years, depending on the 
availability of data as we have tried to avoid including the period after the 2008 
Financial Crisis. They differ in regard to the treatment given to State Ownership. While 
the first follows the general trend of considering it as a unique variable in the second 
specification we try to separate the impact of different levels of ownership, recognizing 
the differences they encompass. The table 11 and 12 provided in the appendix 
summarize our explanatory and control variables and describe the observations 
included in the regression. 
6 Results and Discussion 
6.1 Main Findings 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 As it is possible to observe from Table 2 our results for changes in profitability 
following a privatization operation support the stated hypothesis that changes in 
profitability would be higher for Non-Residual Privatizations. Indeed, while changes in 
ROS and ROA are not statistically significant for Residual Privatizations, the opposite is 
not true for the remaining transactions, which experience mean (median) increases in 
ROS of 2.0 percentage points (1.0 points) and ROA of 1.0 percentage points (1.0 points), 
both changes significant at the 1% level. This evidence concerning Non-Residual 
Privatization is therefore in accordance with previous studies and our previously stated 
expectation. 
 However, it is interesting to note that for EBIT Margin the changes are 
insignificant for both groups. This result is, to a certain extent, intriguing because it 
occurs simultaneously with a significant change in ROS for firms who privatized non-
residual stakes and these two ratios only differ in the measure of profitability used in 
the numerator.  
40 
 
Table 2 - Comparison of Pre and Post Privatization Performance 
 
 As a result, drawing on the critical assessment made by J.E. Farinós et al. (2007) 
that performance measures used in previous studies "can on occasion be misleading if 













Z Statistic for 
Difference in 
Medians (after - 
before)
Profitability
ROS 51 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.55 0.586
(0.05) (0.06) (0.01)
120 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.63 2.843***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.00)
ROA 51 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.55 0.548
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
121 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.60 2.018**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
EBIT Margin 51 0.14 0.14 0.00 (0.55) -0.703
(0.10) (0.11) (0.02)
120 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.59 0.885
(0.10) (0.10) (0.01)
Efficiency
Sales Efficiency 49 0.96 1.05 0.09 0.65 2.512**
(0.94) (1.01) (0.07)
117 0.94 1.09 0.14 0.79 6.198***
(0.92) (1.07) (0.15)
49 -4978 -1995 2982 0.55 1.248
-(1275) -(258) (1017)
117 -4722 1909 6631 0.74 4.832***
-(2766) (1238) (4003)
Capital Investment
51 0.14 0.13 -0.01 (0.57) -0.830
(0.09) (0.09) (0.00)
116 0.15 0.12 -0.03 (0.58) -2.128**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.00)
51 0.07 0.07 0.00 (0.51) -1265.0.
(0.06) (0.06) (0.00)
117 0.08 0.07 -0.01 (0.63) -3.274***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.00)
Employment
Employees 51 44574 49451 4876 0.61 2.381**
(19102) (26361) (7259)
121 36959 41589 4630 0.56 0.943
(13459) (13841) (382)
Leverage
51 0.28 0.28 0.01 0.53 0.375
(0.26) (0.28) (0.02)
120 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.50 -0.056
(0.28) (0.27) -(0.01)
***,**,* Significant at 1,5 and 10 percent levels, respectively
Residual 
Privatization
For each variable we give the number of observations, the mean and median (between parenthesis) values of the proxy 3 years 
before and 3 years after the event, the mean and median change in the variable's value and a test of significance of the median 
change (the Wilcoxon signed-rank test). We also provide the percentage of firms exhibiting the dominant trend, with negative 












































that improvements in profitability come mostly from a better management of financial 
resources as well as of the tax paid by privatized firms. This results from the fact that 
firms who have higher leverage ratios also benefit from higher tax shields, meaning that 
such ratios measure not only the operating performance but also the management of 
financial resources and the impact of financial leverage.  
 This better financial management can come from two different sources. Firstly, 
firms may adopt a more optimized capital structure. Indeed, such explanation would go 
in the direction of the finding of D'Souza et al. (2007) that one of the sources in the 
improvements registered by privatized firms comes from the financial restructuring in 
which privatized firms engage, leading to a decrease in leverage. Secondly, Non-Residual 
Privatization is very often associated with access to the financial markets which may 
allow firms to have access to new and cheaper sources of financing while diversifying 
their financing sources. Hence, privatized firms may be able to reduce their financial 
expenses while still benefiting from debt's tax shields, optimizing their financial 
management. In addition, it is also possible that privatized firms, when released of 
government's influence, also try to minimize the value of taxes paid in comparison to 
when they were under Governments' influence. 
 However, looking at the results obtained for our leverage ratio we are not able to 
provide support for the hypothesis that firms improvements in profitability come from 
changes in capital structure since changes in Leverage are not statistically significant, 
leading us to conclude that the gains in profitability may effectively come from our 
second possible explanation. A possible explanation for the insignificant changes in 
leverage levels for Non-Residual Privatizations was advanced by N. Boubakri et al. 
(2009) who did not also find evidence of decreases in leverage for his sample of 
privatized firms in strategic industries. According to the same authors that could be 
partially explained by the fact that SOEs, particularly in strategic industries, which also 
make up a great part of the present sample, usually carry great amounts of debt making 
it more difficult to witness an immediate decrease in the level of leverage. 
 In terms of Operating Efficiency both measures indicate that privatization 
transactions, regardless of its type, are associated with substantial improvements in it. 
In fact, only our Residual Privatization subsample registers a non significant 
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improvement in Net Income Efficiency, though the change is equally positive. If we take 
a closer look at the information reported in the Table 2 it is possible to see that such 
changes are stronger for the initial privatization operations as we had anticipated. For 
example, this subset of privatization operations experiences an average (median) 
increase of 0.14 (0.13) in Sales Efficiency compared to an average (median) increase of 
0.1 (0.7) when residual stakes are sold. However, the reasons behind the detected 
improvements for our residual transactions are not clear to us and by analyzing our next 
hypothesis we expect to have more information to understand them. 
 Our results for the impact in employment are according to our expectation that 
residual privatization, and thus reduced government's influence, is not associated with 
the reduction of employment as following them firms register a mean (median) increase 
in the number of employees of 4876 (7259). Nevertheless, we believe that establishing a 
casual relationship between the two would be inaccurate and that most likely such 
increases are the result of the expansion and increase in scope of firms since such 
increases take place simultaneously with the mentioned increase in the sales efficiency 
ratio. What may be argued is that such results support the fact that in the long-term 
privatization is actually associated with increases in employment, supported by the 
comment of Megginson (2003) that improvements in performance are "achieved 
without systematically reducing employment". 
 For the last variable to be analyzed, capital investment, we find a statistically 
significant reduction, at the 10% level, in both capital investment proxies for our Non-
Residual Privatization stages, contrary to previous studies who predict and document 
increases in Capital Investment following privatization. To understand what may be 
behind such results, similarly to Megginson et al. (1999), we have also analyzed real 
capital expenditure by normalizing them using the same procedure as for Sales 
Efficiency. When doing so we are actually capable of finding a significant increase in 
capital investments changes meaning that the insignificant results are due to "sales and 
total assets increasing at a faster rate than capital expenditures".  
Performance prior to privatization operations  
 Comparing the results previously obtained with the ones in Table 3 it is possible 
to find support for our second Hypothesis that Governments are not only able but  
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effectively restructure firms prior to privatization. Indeed, focusing on the subsample of 
non-residual privatizations it is possible to see that the improvements in all the 
measures of profitability and efficiency analyzed are actually considerably stronger 
during this period, with the mean (median) increase in ROS growing from 2.00 
percentage points (1.0 point) to 3.00 percentage points (2.0 points) for example. As a 
result, all the profitability and efficiency ratios, with the exception of the EBIT Margin 
are now significant at the 1% level, given support to the fact that part of the registered 
improvements in performance actually take place before and not following the 
privatization. Moreover, the fact that the improvements in the EBIT Margin are now 
statistically significant, with a mean (median) increase of 1 percentage point (1.00 
point), may mean that operating profitability is essentially improved prior to 
privatization since in the period [1,3] we were unable to find any significant 
improvement. 
 Such finding is in accordance with the privatization experience in some of the 
countries belonging to our sample. For example, Berne and Pogorel (2004) have 
observed that several French companies, as Thomson and Air France, were only 
privatized when they became attractive investments which meant that such firms were 
forced to go through a long process of restructuration that involved, among other things, 
the reduction of leverage, injection of new capital and restructuring.  
 In addition, it is also possible to observe that the reduction previously detected in 
Capital Expenditures actually takes place essentially during in the period [-1,1], which 
may be a sign of the Government's objective of maximizing the cash-flows in the short-
term and raise the proceeds from the privatization, ensuring the success of the 
privatization transaction, which is particularly relevant given the predominant nature of 
Public Offers in our sample. This discovery may explain why we were unable to find the 
expected increase in investment in our first analysis. However, we must also bear in 
mind the possibility, which we are not able to exclude, that governments manipulate 
some of the accounting data and variables in order to make firms more attractive. 
 Surprisingly, it is important to note that, while insignificant after privatization, 
the tests showed above demonstrate that Residual Privatizations are equally associated 
with statistically significant improvements in profitability and efficiency during the 
44 
 
period [-1,1] in relation to the 3 years before. Although the reasons behind such finding 
are not clear for us we would like to advance two alternative explanations.  
Table 3 -Analysis of changes in performance prior to privatization 
 
Variables Type N
Mean     
[-5,-3] 
(Median)









Z Statistic for 
Difference in Medians 
(after - before)
Profitability
ROS 43 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.77 2.995***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02)
87 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.70 4.419***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
ROA 43 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.72 3.007***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
87 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.74 4.499***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
EBIT Margin 43 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.67 1.968**
(0.08) (0.10) (0.01)
88 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.58 1.938*
(0.08) (0.10) (0.01)
Efficiency
Sales Efficiency 41 0.92 1.10 0.18 0.66 3.713***
(0.93) (1.06) (0.13)
87 0.95 1.11 0.16 0.84 5.777***
(0.93) (1.10) (0.16)
42 -5790 8792 14582 0.83 3.870***
-(2922) (4361) (7283)
86 -519 7167 7686 0.80 6.379***
-(1438) (3137) (4575)
Capital Investment
44 0.14 0.12 -0.02 (0.57)  -0.782
(0.09) (0.09) (0.00)
86 0.13 0.11 -0.02 (0.62) -2.474**
(0.12) (0.10) -(0.02)
44 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.52 -0.408
(0.07) (0.06) -(0.01)
86 0.09 0.07 -0.01 (0.66) -2.965***
(0.08) (0.06) -(0.01)
Employment
Employees 44 49394 51230 1835 0.61 0.922
(22369) (25104) (2736)
87 47871 51390 3519 0.60 1.202
(17472) (19052) (1580)
Leverage
44 0.27 0.28 0.02 0.52 0.467
(0.24) (0.28) (0.04)
87 0.29 0.27 -0.02 (0.54) -1.384
(0.28) (0.27) -(0.02)
***,**,* Significant at 1,5 and 10 percent levels, respectively














For each variable we give the number of observations, the mean and median (between parenthesis) values of the proxy 
3 years before and 3 years after the event, the mean and median change in the variable's value and a test of significance 
of the median change (the Wilcoxon signed-rank test). We also provide the percentage of firms exhibiting the dominant 

































 First, it may be that, despite their reduced influence, governments are still 
capable of influencing or enforcing improvements in the privatized firm's performance 
in order to maximize proceeds with the operation (here it is necessary to note that we 
are not once again able to exclude some "forced" manipulation of accounting data). 
Nevertheless, it is our belief that the explanation is different, with an inverse casual 
relationship, and that we are actually before a situation of market timing, with the 
Government further divesting from privatized firms in periods where the operational 
performance, and probably as a result the stock price, is higher. Nevertheless, this 
hypothesis requires further research by crossing information from  share prices with 
the results just presented. 
 Nevertheless, a possible bias in the analysis just made is that some of the 
privatization transactions analyzed in the sample are preceded by other privatization 
transactions in the years before it. As a result, it may be the case that the changes 
detected are actually caused by those transactions rather than the action of 
governments, probably indicating that the effects of privatization may take a certain 
time to actually materialize in improvements since certain aspects that affect efficiency, 
namely cultural issues, are more difficult to change in the short-term. However, by 
analyzing the years before the transactions included in this test we are able to conclude 
that its impact, particularly for Non-Residual Privatizations, is not substantial, although 
we are not able to reject any influence in the results observed.  
 Indeed, by observing the table presented below, which presents what happened 
in the years before the event, we can see that for the non-residual subsample nearly 
70% did not have a privatization up to 5 years before. The same is not, though, as it 
would be expected, true for the group of residual privatizations. Nevertheless, we still 
have a weight of 50% of operations that were not followed by any prior privatization up 
to 5 years before, which, although not high enough to discard such possibility (especially 
because we have 20% of the events preceded by privatization operations in the 2 years 
before), it gives us some confidence to at least conclude that the impact of previous 




Table 4 - History of privatizations before the analyzed event 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) Regression 
 The results obtained using the model DiD, summarized in Table 5, provide 
empirical support to our hypothesis that privatized firms are able to close the gap in 
terms of profitability and that the performance gap is essentially closed in the first 
privatization operations (which fall predominantly in the category of Non-Residual 
Privatizations). This can be observed by the fact that, despite privatized firms in the 
Non-Residual group having lower ROS and ROA prior to privatization operations 
(though not strong enough to be statistically significant), in the period following 
privatization this was no longer the case. Indeed, the statistical significance of the DiD 
estimator at the 1% level for ROS and 5% level for ROA does lead us to conclude that 
this subsample of firms registered in the 3 years following privatization a higher growth 
in ROA and ROS that allowed them to catch up with their peers. 
 For EBIT Margin we also have a statistically significant DiD estimator at the 5% 
level but in this case it appears that it was mostly obtained thanks to a decrease in our 
control group's EBIT Margin.  
 In addition to this, the statistical results hereby presented also offer support to 
the assertion that firms residually owned by the State do not underperform their fully 
private peers. In fact, they appear to over perform their control group, though only the 
ROA before privatization is significant at the 10% level. In fact, the trend for Residual 
Privatizations in terms of convergence is the opposite to the other group since it is 
actually the private firms that improve their performance at a faster pace, with the DiD 
estimator being negative for the profitability ratios. 
 
1 Year Before 2 Years Before 3 Years Before 4 Years Before > 4 Years 1st Privatization
Non-Residual 7 (8%) 8 (9%) 10 (11%) 2 (2%) 15 (17%) 45 (52%)
Residual 5 (11%) 5 (11%) 8 (18%) 3 (7%) 19 (43%) 3 (7%)
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Table 5 - Analysis of post privatization convergence through DiD Regressions 
Before After
Difference       
[After-Before] Before After
Difference       
[After-Before]
Non-Residual Privatization 4.88 6.54 1.66** Non-Residual Privatization 3.35 4.35 1**
Control Group 6.47 6.07 -0.40 Control Group 4.02 3.86 -0.16
Residual Privatization 7.11 7.07 -0.03 Residual Privatization 4.38 4.37 -0.01
Control Group 4.88 5.39 0.51 Control Group 3.31 3.41 0.10
Difference (Non-Residual) -1.59 0.48 2.06*** Difference (Non-Residual) -0.67 0.48 1.15**
Difference (Residual) 2.23 1.68 -0.5 Difference (Residual) 1.07* 0.96 -0.1
Before After
Difference       
[After-Before] Before After
Difference       
[After-Before]
Non-Residual Privatization 12.70 13.39 0.69 Non-Residual Privatization 94.52 108.94 14.42***
Control Group 13.72 12.52 -1.19* Control Group 99.78 111.46 11.68***
Residual Privatization 13.67 13.80 0.13 Residual Privatization 95.67 105.93 10.25**
Control Group 11.06 11.78 0.72 Control Group 97.31 102.45 5.14
Difference (Non-Residual) -1.02 0.86 1.88** Difference (Non-Residual) -5.26** -2.52 2.73
Difference (Residual) 2.61 2.02 -0.5 Difference (Residual) -1.63 3.49 5.12
ROS ROA
EBIT Margin Sales Efficiency
This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates on different ratios use as proxies to operating performance. Non-Residual Privatizations include firms in 
which the state was a majority shareholder and divested part of its holding. Residual Privatization includes firms in each the State privatized part of its residual and 
non-controlling stake. Before refers to the three years before the event and After refers to the three years that follow it.  Numbers in parentheses are . ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The t-statistics were computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and 
clustering at the country level
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 This further adds to the previous evidence that residual privatization is not 
associated with improvements in performance and a potential explanation is now given 
by the fact that the potential for performance improvements is considerably more 
reduced in such cases as the gap of performance appears to have already been closed, 
which is particularly relevant in the case of highly competitive markets where no market 
power exists. However, such results are only valid when considering the profitability 
proxies as if we look at sales efficiency these former SOEs appear to underperform their 
control groups (see appendix). 
 On the contrary, in  terms of operating performance our DiD regression does not 
provide conclusive evidence supporting the prediction that privatized firms close the 
gap since our DiD estimators, though positive, are not statistically significant6. This 
questions previous studies who conclude for improvements in efficiency without 
adequately comparing the registered improvements with a relevant benchmark. In fact, 
it is possible to observe, given that the measure of Sales Efficiency was normalized, that 
all the groups register improvements in the proxy used after privatization and that only 
for the Control Group of Residual Privatizations they are not significant. Interesting to 
note as well is the fact that this time it appears that it is for Residual Privatizations 
where the gap of performance is closed which may suggest some long term effect of 
privatization as privatized firms become more efficient and productive. However, this 
effect is not significant and is contradicted by the results obtained for the second ratio of 
operating performance (see appendix). 
 As a result, our evidence does not allow us to conclude that the gap in terms of 
efficiency is closed following privatization as well as that the previously documented 
improvements in efficiency ratios are caused by the privatization. For this reason we 
advance two possible explanations for the non significance of the results. The first relies 
on the  limitation of the efficiency measures employed in this and in most studies 
regarding privatization. Arocena and Oliveros (2012) note this very well when stating 
that "most studies focus on the analysis of single-factor productivity measures or partial 
economic and financial indicators, largely ignoring estimates of productive efficiency", 
rejecting that profitability is a good proxy to measure efficiency.  
                                                          
6
 The absolute and not normalized values of the efficiency proxies may be also found in the appendix 
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 The problem mentioned regarding the "single-factor productivity" measure of 
efficiency is particularly relevant due to the fact that, as already detailed, most of the 
firms belonging to this sample are generally capital intensive. Hence, such a measure of 
performance is not capable of accurately capturing improvements in efficiency 
concerning the use of capital or the employment of more advance technology. For that 
reason, in results not reported here, we have also analyzed Asset Turnover, commonly 
used as a proxy for the efficient use of capital, but found no significant changes. 
 The second possible explanation is built on the notion of experience curve, which 
states that the more experience a firm has in producing their product the lower are its 
costs due to, among other factors, a more efficient allocation of the labor input7. Hence, it 
may be the case that improvements in efficiency previously documented in privatization 
studies are also due to the fact that firms become naturally more efficient with the 
passage of time and, in general, with the consequent increases in size and sales and not 
due to the changes brought about with the privatization.  
Multivariate Regression 
 The results from our multivariate regression, presented in Table 6, present 
evidence supporting that that residual ownership is not detriment to firms' profitability, 
here measured as ROS though state ownership does impact it significantly. In fact, it 
appears to even have a positive impact on performance, which is statistically significant 
at 5**. This is only possible to observe in the model in each we have categorized 
privatized firms according to their year-on-year state's ownership. Indeed, had not we 
accounted for this, as most of the surveyed studies on privatization and state ownership 
do, and our conclusion would simply be that less state the better. However, it appears 
that such statement is only true up to a certain ownership level and that level appears to 
be 30%, which denotes the existence of a non-concentrated shareholding structure. 
 It is also possible to see that firms in each the state exited also exhibit higher ROS 
significant at the 1% level. Nevertheless, given the limited number of observations 
concerning such cases (only 10% of total observations for privatized firms), the period 
covered in our sample and our previous finding that privatizing residual stakes does not 
lead to performance improvements such results must be interpreted with caution. 





Table 6 - Multivariate Regression analyzing impact of Residual Ownership 
 
 Moreover, our results for efficiency are not clear as there is a lot of variance and 
our dummy variables, contrary to the ROS' regression, do not show a clear trend. In fact, 
the only value that comes significant is the variable representing the periods after which 
state has exited privatized firms shareholding structure which, with a negative 
ROS (1) ROS (2) SALEFF (1) SALEFF (2)












Size -0.005** -0.006** 143.53 146.07
-(2.27) -(2.42) (0.98) (0.95)
Economic Cycle 0.455*** 0.507*** 10431 10036
(3.12) (3.55) (1.10) (1.10)
GDPpc -0.00 -0.0023 433.0* 344.4*
-(0.47) -(0.16) (1.87) (1.75)
Ease of Doing Busines 0.001*** 0.001*** 6.742 7.527
(6.65) (5.67) (0.96) (0.95)
Freedom from corruption 0.000** 0.0008** -10.0** -13539**
(2.53) (2.47) -(2.15) -(2.19)
Business freedom 0.001** 0.001*** 29.62 29.54
(2.46) (2.63) (1.27) (1.31)
Investment freedom 0.000 0.000 17.247 18.296
-(0.19) -(0.56) (0.79) (0.83)
Constant 0.012 -0.028 -8422.352 -7549.873
(0.10) -(0.22) -(1.11) -(1.03)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1571 1571 1514 1514
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.097 0.010 0.010
This table shows the results of the multivariate regressions including the main explanatory 
variable, state ownership, and control variables. The coefficients of the regressions are on the first 
line for each variable, where *, ** and *** represent their significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
The numbers in brackets underneath each coefficient are the t-statistics from the heteroskedasticity-
robust regression. The dependant variable are proxies for profitability and efficiency
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coefficient, may indicate that doing so does not bring additional benefits for the firm. 
However, such results are not very strong and clear which may be based, as just 
discussed, in the inadequacy of Sales Efficiency as a proxy for efficiency (the positive 
coefficient for state ownership is an example of that). For example, our second proxy for 
efficiency (Net Income Efficiency) offers different results from the ones here presented, 
apart from the fact that our exit dummy also has a negative value. 
  
6.2 Robustness Analysis 
 In testing Hypothesis 2 we have analyzed a different time period, comparing the 
period [-5,-3] with the period [-1,1]. However, such comparison and the results obtained 
may be affected by the bias of comparing different realities since, in order to meet the 
criteria of having data for at least 2 years before and 2 years after the benchmark year, 
several firms could not be included in the mentioned analysis. Hence, there is the 
possibility that the conclusions detailed resulted from the fact that we were not 
comparing the same subset of firms, being the real driver of the changes detected the 
exclusion of the mentioned firms. For that reason we have redone the statistical tests for 
the period [-3,3] in order to check if the conclusions remained the same. As the reduced 
sample trends are very close to the full sample we are able to exclude the mentioned 
problem and conclude that the detected differences are, indeed, due to the time frame 
selected. The results for the reduced sample can be observed in the Appendixes.  
 We have also performed two control checks for our DiD regression given the 
mentioned complex nature of finding suitable peers for the privatized firms included in 
the sample. The first one has consisted in adding more 86 peers operating in developed 
economies and in the same industry to our control group (for the remaining 17 firms a 
second acceptable peer was not actually possible to retrieve). The results obtained with 
this enlarged peer group provide additional support to the analysis and discussion of the 
DiD results already presented since the statistical results remain, in general, very similar 
and the detected differences do not impact the aforementioned conclusions. For 
example, the EBIT Margin DiD estimator is no longer significant and at the 5% level but 
since we had not considered such change relevant because it was obtained at the 
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expense of a fall in the performance of our control group our conclusions remain 
unchanged. 
 The second robustness check that we have performed involved including in our 
DiD regression control variables to account for the existence of different economic and 
political environments between our subsamples and the respective control groups (see 
appendix). This control has only been done for our profitability proxies, since they were 
the ones where convergence was detected. As a result, we have added the natural 
logarithm of assets as a proxy for firm size and GDP real growth as a proxy for the 
economic cycle in each period. In terms of political variables, we have used three 
rankings computed within the Index of Economic Freedom, aimed at measuring 
countries' degree of economic freedom. This robustness check has only validated our 
finding in terms of ROS as the significance in the coefficient of the DiD estimator for ROA 
and EBIT Margin disappears when we account for differences in the economic 
environment. As a result, we are able to make two inferences from this check: 
1. The results presented in terms of convergence need to be analyzed with 
additional caution due to the difficulties encountered in having a suitable peer for 
firms operating in strategic industries 
2. The fact that only ROS is able to pass this robustness check may actually provide 
additional evidence to our finding that improvements in profitability do not come 
from an improved use of physical resources, understood as capital or labor, but 
rather from a better use of financial resources 
 
6.3 Discussion of results 
 Taking a global view at the analysis and conclusions presented in this work it 
seems plausible to argue that residual ownership does not negatively impact 
performance of firms. Indeed, combining this with the previously mentioned findings of 
other authors that residual ownership may lead to higher market valuations as well as 
enhance firm's financial performance we are led to conclude that governments' residual 
ownership, particularly as far as strategic industries are concerned, may actually have a 
positive rather than negative performance.  
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 Supporting this view that residual ownership may actually be advantageous are 
some recent cases in which Governments, or local municipalities, have actually entered 
firms' shareholding structures as residual owners. This was the case, for instance, of 
Elisa Corporation in Finland and Beiersdorf AG in Germany. Both cases had one thing in 
common: local authorities decided to step in and assume a residual position in order to 
protect either the local or national interests. In fact, the acquisition of approximately 
10% of Elisa's shares in 2008 was justified as "it was determined that it was of 
particular importance to the State to ensure that at least one major telecom operator 
would remain under Finnish ownership", in an operation considered as unique in the 
history of state ownership in Finland8.  
 Similarly, the City of Hamburg decided to also acquire a 10% stake in 2003 in 
order to ensure that Beiersdorf maintained its operations in Hamburg. Interestingly, this 
stake has already been divested in 2007 for €1.2 billion after a strong growth in sales 
and earnings9 which may actually be an example of the already discussed possibility 
that, when selling residual stakes. Governments' try to time such operations to maximize 
the proceeds. 
 As a matter of fact, our aggregate findings also appear to show that there is a 
change in Government's objectives as the process of privatization unfolds. In fact, we 
consider that when Governments decide to divest part or all of their residual and non-
controlling states they do so mostly for financial rather than operating or economic 
reasons. This is supported in the finding of Bortolotti et al. (2006) that there is a 
correlation between countries' debt ratios and the extent of their privatization program, 
concluding that fiscal conditions are a main driver of privatizations. Thus the likelihood 
that in such operations maximizing the proceeds is considerably more important than in 
the initial operations, where other political and economical objectives play an important 
role. 
 Furthermore, from our perspective this study is also capable of addressing the 
gap left from previous cross-country analyses which "do not allow to conclude that 
privatization per se has been the key in boosting the financial and operating 
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performance of firms, but rather the combination of liberalization, regulatory and 
ownership changes" (Bortolotti and Milella, 2008). Indeed, our subsample of residual 
privatizations may be a way to infer that since the only change involved in such 
operations tends to be the reduction in governments' ownership. As a result our findings 
support the perspective that the improvements in performance come from the several 
changes that take place simultaneously as privatizations rather than from the single 
reduction of state's ownership, namely changes in the market environment or in the 
prevalent models of government ownership and corporate governance. 
 To support this conclusion and in order to better interpret all the presented 
results we would like to mention the conclusions of 3 additional studies. The first study, 
by V.A. Aivazian et al. (2009), has been able to demonstrate that a program of 
corporatization launched in China, which "entailed restructuring the internal 
governance system of these firms while preserving state ownership", was equally 
capable of leading to the desired improvement in SOEs performance. 
 The other two analyze the performance of Government-Linked Companies 
(GLCs), an alternative control structure which became known as a success case, 
particularly in Singapore. According to Ang and Ding (2006) these model is 
characterized by "publicly traded companies in which the government owns a partial 
but substantial cash flow right, and yet a disproportional control right". This work 
analyzes the specific case of Singapore and has found evidence supporting the fact that 
GLCs are not only more highly valued but also that they outperform their peers in a set 
of performance variables. Similarly to this study Feng et al. (2004) have analyzed the 
impact of privatizations through share issue in 30 GLCs and, contrary to us for Non-
Residual operations, found no significant changes in ROS, efficiency and leverage 
measures. To support their findings the authors argue that "the openness of the 
Singapore economy to intense foreign competition and its well-functioning markets may 
be the reasons for their GLCs being comparable to the privately run counterparts in 
efficiency". 
 As a result, if we combine the findings of the current study with those of V.A. 
Aivazian et al. (2009), Ang and Ding (2006) and Feng et al. (2004) it starts to become 
more apparent that governments' presence in firms, contrary to what several studies 
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have argued, is not necessarily negative to firms' performance and efficiency as long as 
those firms operate within a similar environment as private firms and within an efficient 
system of corporate governance. 
 The importance of having an efficient system of corporate governance is 
highlighted by OECD who acknowledges that "how well governments manage these 
assets has a great impact on the substantial values these enterprises represent and thus 
on a country’s public finances. Better performance of these enterprises is a positive 
factor for economic growth and competitiveness"10.  For that reason, we have witnessed 
a considerable improvement of such systems a little bit throughout all Western Europe 
with many Governments establishing entities responsible for managing their 
participations in enterprises. As a matter of fact, that may also be one of the reasons 
while we were not able to find evidence showing that residually owned firms are less 
profitable than their peers. Comparing the system of corporate governance in SOEs and 
partially owned firms with the one in place when the most preeminent studies 
questioning the performance of former SOEs were made is actually an extremely 
complex task .  
 Finally, if we combine the finding that privatized firms did not close the gap in 
relation to the selected peer group in terms of efficiency with the finding that ROS 
increases while the EBIT Margin remains, in general, unchanged then the hypothesis 
that privatization is followed by improvements in operating performance finds little 
support to it. Although this may be due to the facts that part of the operational 
improvements already took place before the privatization as already demonstrated or 
the potential inadequacy of the proxies used to measure efficiency we would also like to 
advance another explanation.  
 Thus, we consider that while the changes in profitability, namely through 
financial restructuring, are easier to obtain and more short-term oriented the same does 
not apply to operational efficiency. Indeed, as efficiency is deeply rooted in workers' 
productivity and the technological level existent at firms, improving efficiency, at least in 
a generalized and sustainable way, may require a longer period . This can be explained 
by the fact that workers' productivity is closely related with their culture, which is 






before privatization closer to public workers' culture and is something much more 
complex to change, and that investments in improving technological also tend to have a 
more long-term impact.  
6.4 Limitations and Further Research 
 To start with, when analyzing the main results and conclusions here presented it 
is important to bear in mind that the proxies used to measure efficiency, as shown in the 
DiD regression, may not be the most adequate and hence our results are contingent to 
the "extent that profitability and efficiency can be equated" (Dewenter and Malatesta, 
2001). Indeed, P. Arocena and D. Oliveros (2012) note exactly that higher profitability 
may come from higher market power and not higher efficiency. 
 Another important note to bear in mind is that finding a set of comparable peers 
who have experienced the same changes in the operating environment as our sample of 
privatized firms is a particularly challenging task. As a result, our sample of peer firms 
belongs very often to different countries and inclusively different economic areas (in 
fact only 47 of our peers are actually from Europe). This means that the presented 
results must be analyzed with additional caution, as our regression with additional 
control variables has demonstrated (though the results did not change much after 
adding more peers). 
 The dynamic nature of the most of the privatization experiences in Western 
Europe, with several firms being privatized in several stages and some of them in a short 
period of time, also requires us to analyze some of the results with caution as it is not 
always possible to disentangle the effects between different privatization stages.  
 In addition, similarly to previous works using the methodology employed by 
Megginson et al. (1994) our study is also affected by two major drawbacks. The first 
results from focusing on companies only privatized through Public Offers since it may 
introduce some biases, namely selection bias, as these companies tend not only to be the 
largest and most profitable SOEs but have also usually been subject to some pre-
privatization restructuring in order to make the privatization run smoother, as several 
studies using this methodology have noted. However, since we are mostly concerned 
exactly with these large, strategic firms and the impact of state's ownership in them 
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(instead of the impact of states' ownership on the average firm) we consider such 
problem to be less relevant for the present study. The second drawback, actually more 
relevant for us, is related with the fact that such methodology is not able to account for 
changes in the macroeconomic, competitive or regulatory environment or for the fact 
that governments may use alternative forms of exerting influence in privatized firms 
apart from voting shares, as Golden Shares. Hence, although by considering residual 
privatizations we are at least able to separate the effects of ownership from other 
initiatives and changes in regulation launched side-by-side with the first privatization 
operations, the presented results most bear in mind the mentioned caveats. 
 We also consider that, as pointed by J. D’Souza et al. (2005), having only 
considered public traded companies in developed economies contributes to reduce 
several of the problems associated with bad quality of data that tend to appear in 
multinational studies of privatization. 
  Furthermore, our research has also left some open questions and space for future 
research. To start with, our analysis of the period prior to Residual Privatizations has 
left the question of whether or not there is an "opportunistic" behavior from the 
Government who may time the Residual Privatization operations, conducting them 
when performance and probably share prices are more favorable. For this reason, it 
would be interesting to explore this issue in greater detail, trying to separate other 
factors that may have accounted for the detected trend, such as recent privatization 
operations. 
 In addition, analyzing residual privatizations only from a perspective of 
performance is, at best, a partial analysis of all the issues involved. Indeed, the objectives 
behind such operations may not be, as already pointed out, to improve performance but 
to obtain important revenues. It is easily observed, and the recent wave of residual 
privatization shows exactly this, that indebted countries use the proceeds to amortize 
debt and as a result reduce the amount of interest paid, gaining some slack in their fiscal 
budget. Hence, an additional issue to explore can be understanding, through a cost-
benefit analysis, whether or not Governments have gained more from the reduction in 
the interests paid than from the annual flow of revenues as dividends or if in the long-
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term they could have actually had access to higher revenues, through dividends as well 
as the appreciation of shares. 
 Finally, the aspects regarding the impact of residual privatization in financial 
performance, which have been left outside the scope of the present study, may also add 
important insights to the discussion regarding the implications of residual ownership 
and the impact of residual privatization. 
7 Conclusion  
 The previously presented results make several important contributions to the 
still unresolved debate of what should be the role of the State in the corporate sector 
and the impact of residual ownership and privatization in firms. First, our sample 
provides empirical support to the fact that firms' performance, understood as 
profitability, is not affected by privatization operations after the State has relinquished 
control. This may be due to the fact that firms residually owned by governments do not 
underperform their peers, as our DiD and multivariate regression appear to indicate as 
far as profitability is concerned. In addition, residual privatizations are associated with 
significant increases in employment which may indicate a positive long-term effect of 
privatization programs in this variable. 
 Thus, it appears that State's do not have to fully exit SOEs shareholding structures 
in order to make them reach their potential in terms of performance as it was the case in 
several strategic industries in Spain, the UK and more recently Portugal. On the contrary, 
the establishment of an efficient system of corporate governance, the role of capital 
markets in monitoring performance and the implementation of measures that 
approximate the operating environment to those of private firms seem to be conditions 
strong enough to avoid privatized firms being less profitable.   
 Second, we have also been able to show that, similarly to previous studies, our 
sample of firms registered improvements in the variables measuring profitability and 
efficiency in the period [-1,1] regardless of the type of privatization. Indeed, this has led 
us to conclude for the fact that governments are not only capable of successfully 
improving firms performance as well as that they seem to time further privatization 
operations. Hence, the two mentioned findings support the argument advanced by 
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Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) that privatizations' main role is to remove the influence 
that future governments may exert on privatized firms, ensuring that the improvements 
in performance overcome the test of time and possible changes in political orientation. 
 Third, with our DiD regression we are also able to show that, while privatized 
firms are capable of significantly closing the gap to their private peers in terms of 
profitability, the same does not happen in terms of efficiency as all our subsamples 
experience significant growth in our proxy for efficiency. Similarly, our multivariate 
regression also fails to show that residually owned firms are as efficient as private ones. 
Making the bridge of these finding with the fact that significant improvements in 
profitability seem to be obtained mostly at the expense of a better management of 
financial resources has led us to question previous studies methodologies in concluding 
that privatized firms become more efficient. 
 Finally, it is important to note that our findings regarding the impact of residual 
ownership in profitability, which is actually higher for firms residually owned as our 
multivariate analysis and DiD indicate, combined with previous authors research 
indicate that contrary to what many defend residual ownership may actual be beneficial 
for both privatized firms and the State. Nevertheless, a definite conclusion requires 
further research to fully grasp all the implications of residual ownership, namely in 
financial performance and in efficiency, whose results in this study have led us to 
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Figure 3 - Revenues in Western Europe vs Rest of the World (1977-2004) 
 
Source: Elaborations on Securities Data Corporation by Bortolotti and Milella, 2008. 
 
Figure 4 - Privatization in Western Europe: Distribution of Revenues by Sector 
 




Figure 5 - Strategic vs Other Sectors (1977-2004) 
 
Source: Elaborations on Securities Data Corporation by Bortolotti and Milella, 2008. 
 




Table 7 - Privatizations in Western Europe per country (1977-2002) 
 
Table 8 - Description of classification of classification of operations 
 
 
Country Deals Revenues PO/Deals PO/Rev Rev/Deals Rev/GDP
Portugal 78 25,453.65 0.51 0.8 326.33 0.19
United Kingdom 183 145.531.73 0.32 0.88 795.26 0.11
Finland 56 16,328.63 0.43 0.66 291.58 0.1
Italy 103 96,442.39 0.44 0.84 936.33 0.08
Spain 74 46,577.60 0.35 0.79 629.43 0.06
Sweden 56 18,625.54 0.2 0.7 332.6 0.06
Austria 51 11,503.06 0.57 0.51 225.55 0.04
Netherlands 29 19,182.48 0.38 0.66 661.46 0.04
France 97 59,875.26 0.53 0.92 617.27 0.03
Germany 150 73,302.53 0.14 0.66 488.68 0.03
Belgium 10 5,707.97 0.2 0.18 570.8 0.02
Mean 81 47.139.17 0.37 0.69 534.12 0.07
Median 74 25.453.65 0.38 0.7 570.8 0.05
Deals is the number of privatizations; Revenues is Total Revenues from Privatizations for the 
period in US$ mil 1995; Po/Deals is the number of privatizations by Public Offer as a % of the total 
number of privatizations; PO/Rev is % of revenues raised through Public Offers of Shares from 
privatizations; Rev/GDP is the ratio of revenues for the period to the 2002 GDP (in US$ mil 1995)
Initial Classification Description Final 
Classification
Remained Under State Control Government privatizes part of the SOE but the
control remains with it. This can include first
privatization operation as well as subsequent
transactions 
Transfer of Control to Private
Investors
Government relinquishes control either by
fully exiting as a shareholder or by maintaining 
a non-controlling stake
Residual Stake Sold Government owns a non-controlling stake and
divests part of it
Residual Stake Sold and no
ownership remains
Government owns a non-controlling stake and
divests it in its totality
State acquires minority stake Government acquires a minority stake in a







Table 9 - Description of firms included in the sample 
 
By Country Number Percentage Assets (€000s) By Sector Number Percentage Assets (€000s)
Austria 12 11.32% 2.559.592.58     Telecommunications 11 10.38% 19.061.612.73   
Belgium 3 2.83% 3.648.078.67     Petroleum Industry 8 7.55% 13.472.703.50   
Finland 10 9.43% 2.969.070.80     Transportation Industry 20 18.87% 11.142.981.30   
France 22 20.75% 21.223.488.23   Utilities 23 21.70% 16.604.598.13   
Germany 13 12.26% 23.693.427.77   Manufacturing 37 34.91% 5.337.720.62     
Greece 6 5.66% 2.693.270.83     Services 6 5.66% 1.487.806.50     
Ireland 2 1.89% 1.116.615.00     Trade Industry 1 0.94% 204.416.00         
Italy 14 13.21% 9.252.962.93     
Netherlands 5 4.72% 5.993.204.60     
Portugal 8 7.55% 4.002.202.88     








By Type Number Percentage By Country Number Percentage
Remained Under State Control 56 32.56% Austria 20 11.63%
Transfer of Control to Private Investors 65 37.79% Belgium 4 2.33%
Residual Stake Sold 22 12.79% Finland 18 10.47%




By Sector Number Percentage Italy 18 10.47%
Telecommunications 23 13.37% Netherlands 8 4.65%
Petroleum Industry 18 10.47% Portugal 13 7.56%
Transportation Industry 29 16.86% Spain 19 11.05%
Utilities 34 19.77%
Manufacturing 60 34.88% By Period Number Percentage
Services 7 4.07% 1985-1989 21 12.21%







Table 11 - Variables used in Multivariate Regression 
 











Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when Government controls more than 
50% of voting rights
Z50
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when Government controls between 50 
and 40% of voting rights
Z40
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when Government controls more than 
40% and 30% of voting rights
Z30
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when Government controls less than 
30% of voting rights
Exited
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when Government no longer holds any 
control over the privatized firm
Control Variables
Firm-specific
Size Natural log of total assets for each year
Economic
Economic Cycle Percentage Real GDP Growth for each year
GDPpc Natural log of GDP per capita in US Dollars for each year
Political
Ease of Doing Busines 2013 Ranking in Ease of Doing Business for each country
Freedom from corruption Variable obtained from Index of Economic Freedom for each year and country
Business freedom Variable obtained from Index of Economic Freedom for each year and country
Investment freedom Variable obtained from Index of Economic Freedom for each year and country
By Year Observations Per Type
1991-1995 39 More than 50% 152
1996-2000 222 40%<x<50% 30
2001-2005 972 30%<x<40% 193








Mean     
[-5,-3] 
(Median)









Z Statistic for 
Difference in Medians 
(after - before)
Profitability
ROS 43 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.77 2.995***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02)
87 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.70 4.419***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
ROA 43 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.72 3.007***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
87 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.74 4.499***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
EBIT Margin 43 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.67 1.968**
(0.08) (0.10) (0.01)
88 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.58 1.938*
(0.08) (0.10) (0.01)
Efficiency
Sales Efficiency 41 0.92 1.10 0.18 0.66 3.713***
(0.93) (1.06) (0.13)
87 0.95 1.11 0.16 0.84 5.777***
(0.93) (1.10) (0.16)
42 -5790 8792 14582 0.83 3.870***
-(2922) (4361) (7283)
86 -519 7167 7686 0.80 6.379***
-(1438) (3137) (4575)
Capital Investment
44 0.14 0.12 -0.02 (0.57)  -0.782
(0.09) (0.09) (0.00)
86 0.13 0.11 -0.02 (0.62) -2.474**
(0.12) (0.10) -(0.02)
44 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.52 -0.408
(0.07) (0.06) -(0.01)
86 0.09 0.07 -0.01 (0.66) -2.965***
(0.08) (0.06) -(0.01)
Employment
Employees 44 49394 51230 1835 0.61 0.922
(22369) (25104) (2736)
87 47871 51390 3519 0.60 1.202
(17472) (19052) (1580)
Leverage
44 0.27 0.28 0.02 0.52 0.467
(0.24) (0.28) (0.04)
87 0.29 0.27 -0.02 (0.54) -1.384
(0.28) (0.27) -(0.02)
***,**,* Significant at 1,5 and 10 percent levels, respectively














For each variable we give the number of observations, the mean and median (between parenthesis) values of the proxy 
3 years before and 3 years after the event, the mean and median change in the variable's value and a test of significance 
of the median change (the Wilcoxon signed-rank test). We also provide the percentage of firms exhibiting the dominant 





































Difference       
[After-Before]
Non-Residual Privatization 4.88      6.54      1.66**
Control Group 1 6.47      6.07      -0.40
Control Group 1 + 2 6.40      6.27      -0.14
Residual Privatization 7.11      7.07      -0.03
Control Group 1 4.88      5.39      0.51
Control Group 1 +2 4.89      5.86      0.97*
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1) 1.59 -     0.48      2.06***
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1 +2) 1.52 -     0.28      1.79**
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1) 2.23 1.68 -0.5
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1+ 2) 2.22      1.21      -1.0
ROS
Before After
Difference       
[After-Before]
Non-Residual Privatization 3.35      4.35      1**
Control Group 1 4.02      3.86      -0.16
Control Group 1 + 2 4.05      4.16      0.12
Residual Privatization 4.38      4.37      -0.01
Control Group 1 3.31      3.41      0.10
Control Group 1 +2 3.63      3.88      0.25
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1) 0.67 -     0.48      1.15**
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1 +2) 0.70 -     0.18      0.88*
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1) 1.07* 0.96 -0.1








Difference       
[After-Before]
Non-Residual Privatization 12.70    13.39    0.69
Control Group 1 13.72    12.52    -1.19*
Control Group 1 + 2 14.02    13.16    -0.86
Residual Privatization 13.67    13.80    0.13
Control Group 1 11.06    11.78    0.72
Control Group 1 +2 11.60    12.51    0.91
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1) 1.02 -     0.86      1.88**
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1 +2) 1.32 -     0.23      1.54
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1) 2.61 2.02 -0.5
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1+ 2) 2.07      1.29      -0.7
EBIT Margin
Before After
Difference       
[After-Before]
Non-Residual Privatization 94.52    108.94  14.42***
Control Group 1 99.78    111.46  11.68***
Control Group 1 + 2 99.66    111.03  11.37***
Residual Privatization 95.67    105.93  10.25**
Control Group 1 97.31    102.45  5.14
Control Group 1 +2 98.31    105.74  7.42*
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1) -5.26** 2.52 -     2.73
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1 +2) -5.13** 2.09 -     3.04
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1) -1.63 3.49 5.12
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1+ 2) 2.64 -     0.19      2.83
Sales Efficiency
Before After
Difference       
[After-Before]
Non-Residual Privatization 4.848.77 -    1.851.76  6700.524***
Control Group 1 494.05         4.226.82  3732.77
Control Group 1 + 2 936.22 -        5.919.97  6856.18***
Residual Privatization 5.112.25 -    101.88      5214.132*
Control Group 1 7.137.32 -    3.966.97  11104.28***
Control Group 1 +2 5.930.19 -    9.499.88  15430.07**
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1) -5.342.81** 2.375.07 - 2967
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1 +2) 3.912.54 -    4.068.21 - -155
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1) 2.025.07 -3.865.08 -5890*








Difference       
[After-Before]
Non-Residual Privatization 29.833.30   34.502.60   4669.30
Control Group 1 35.958.59   41.298.55   5339.96
Control Group 1 + 2 39.899.49   48.043.86   8144.37
Residual Privatization 33.450.51   37.988.91   4538.40
Control Group 1 38.890.01   44.500.68   5610.67
Control Group 1 +2 44.854.63   53.502.17   8647.54
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1) 6.125.29 -    6.795.95 -    -670
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1 +2) 10.066.19 -  13.541.26 -  -3475
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1) 5.439.50 -    6.511.77 -    -1072
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1+ 2) 11.404.12 -  15.513.26 -  -4109
Sales Efficiency
Before After
Difference       
[After-Before]
Non-Residual Privatization 12.674.76   19.113.41   6438.65
Control Group 1 19.274.75   23.219.57   3944.82
Control Group 1 + 2 20.001.88   26.616.99   6615.11
Residual Privatization 26.782.03   31.862.41   5080.38
Control Group 1 15.395.52   26.591.45   11195.93
Control Group 1 +2 19.006.21   34.382.72   15376.52
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1) 6.599.99 -    4.106.16 -    2493
Difference (Non-Residual - Control Group 1 +2) 7.327.12 -    7.503.58 -    -176
Difference (Residual - Control Group 1) 11.386.51   5.270.95     -6115*




Table 15 - Difference-in-Difference Regression with control variables 
ROS (1) ROS (2) ROS (3) ROA (1) ROA (2) ROA (3) EBIT Margin (1)EBIT Margin (2)EBIT Margin (3)
Privatized 0.012 0.010 -0.001 -0.007 0.002 0.001 0.022 0.007 -0.018
(0.61) (0.51) -(0.04) -(0.74) (0.20) (0.10) (0.42) (0.13) -(0.37)
After -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.012* -0.010** -0.014**
-(1.00) -(0.41) -(0.93) -(0.76) (1.54) (0.52) -(1.97) -(2.17) -(2.57)
After*Privatized 0.020** 0.015** 0.017** 0.011** 0.007 0.008 0.018** 0.014 0.016
(2.87) (2.16) (2.15) (2.66) (1.59) (1.68) (2.11) (1.54) (1.58)
Log(Assets) 0.007 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.004
-(0.26) -(0.07) -(1.63) -(1.70) (0.54) (0.86)
GDP Growth 0.825*** 0.834*** 0.685*** 0.670*** 1.024*** 1.032
(7.12) (9.89) (7.17) (7.33) (6.30) (6.21)
Freedom from corruption -0.0005* -0.001 -0.001**
-(1.81) -(1.28) -(2.14)
Business freedom 0.000 0.000 -0.001
-(0.71) (0.83) -(1.20)
Investment freedom 0.001 0.000 0.001
(1.15) (0.08) (0.73)
Constant 0.037*** 0.034 0.070 0.040*** 0.091** 0.119 0.104** 0.059 0.192**
(3.25) (0.69) (1.12) (6.66) (2.40) (1.28) (2.48) (0.66) (2.17)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1382 1373 1261 1388 1379 1267 1388 1381 1269
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.071 0.092 0.004 0.070 0.083 0.064 0.088 0.130
Non-Residual
This table shows the results of the robustness analysis made for the DiD regression in the case of Non-Residual operations. The coefficients of the 
regressions are on the first line for each variable, where *, ** and *** represent their significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. The t-statistics were computed 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and clustering at the country level. The dependant variable are the proxies used for profitability and the 
control variables are aimed at capturing differences in firm-factors, economic and political environment
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Table 16 - Multivariate Regression for EBIT Margin and NIEFF 
EBIT Margin (1) EBIT Margin (2) NIEFF (1) NIEFF (2)












Size -0.007*** -0.007*** 10.405 9.9208
-(2.97) -(3.07) (1.10) (0.99)
Economic Cycle 0.566*** 0.613*** 816.4 832.0
(3.03) (3.32) (1.25) (1.32)
GDPpc -0.02 -0.0241 39.59** 36.59**
-(1.59) -(1.46) (2.16) (2.34)
Ease of Doing Busines 0.000*** 0.002*** 1.795*** 1.702***
(1.88) (6.63) (3.59) (3.13)
Freedom from corruption 0.001* 0.0007** 0.176 0.1161
(2.93) (1.96) (0.42) (0.27)
Business freedom -0.00*** 0.001*** 2.738* 2.814*
-(0.06) (2.99) (1.78) (1.90)
Investment freedom 0.002 0.000 0.853 0.904
(7.49) -(0.38) (0.60) (0.63)
Constant 0.244 0.221 -811.805 -777.2105*
(1.64) (1.51) -(1.67) -(1.65)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1593 1593 1547 1547
Adjusted R2 0.143 0.145 0.015 0.015
This table shows the results of the multivariate regressions including the main explanatory variable, state 
ownership, and control variables. The coefficients of the regressions are on the first line for each variable, 
where *, ** and *** represent their significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. The numbers in brackets 
underneath each coefficient are the t-statistics from the heteroskedasticity-robust regression. The 

















Je, soussigné(e), Nuno Filipe Magalhães Moreira, certifie sur l’honneur que je n’ai rien plagié 
dans le travail ci-joint, ce qui signifie que je suis le seul auteur de toutes les phrases dont le 
texte est composé. Toute phrase ayant un autre auteur que moi a été mise entre guillemets, 
avec indication explicite de sa source.  Je suis conscient(e) qu’en contrevenant à la présente 
règle je transgresse les principes académiques reconnus et m’expose aux sanctions qui seront 
prononcées par le conseil de discipline. 
J’atteste également que ce travail n’a jamais été présenté dans le cadre d’études antérieures à 
ESCP Europe. 
S’il s’agit d’un travail réalisé dans le cadre d’études effectuées en parallèle, je dois le préciser. 
 
Les propos tenus dans ce mémoire n’engagent que moi-même. 
 

















































I the undersigned, Nuno Filipe Magalhães Moreira, certify on the honor that I have not 
plagiarized the paper enclosed, which means that I am the only author of all the sentences this 
text is composed of. Any sentence from a different author than me was written in quotation 
marks, with explicit indication of its source. I am aware that by contravening to the present 
rule, I break the recognised academic principles and I expose myself to the sanctions the 
disciplinary committee will decide on. 
I also confirm this work has never been submitted during studies prior to ESCP Europe. 
If this work has been written during studies conducted in parallel, I must precise it. 
 
The remarks written in those pages only commit me. 
 







       Paris, (date) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
